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WIMN0WINQ5 IN iinERIC/IN HISTORT. 



E)IF»LOTvIAXIC SERIES. 

No. I. 



The Qhited 5TflTE5 and ^?Am 



xrr ivso. 



WINNOWINGS IN AMERICAN HISTORY. 



DIPLOMATIC SERIES. 



No. I. 



The United States and Spain 



IN 1790. 



AN EPISODE IN DIPLOMACY DESCRIBED FROM 
HITHERTO UNPUBLISHED SOURCES. 



WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY 

WORTHINGTON CHAUNCEY FORD. 



BROOKLYN, N. Y. : 

HISTORICAI, PRINTING CI,UB. 
1890. 



ET '3 \-3 



:rz 



-•^'>e5 



2S0 Copies Printed. 

No. i-1- 



1898. 



CONTENTS. 



PAGE 

Introduction 7 

Questions of the President 43 

Reply of the Vice-President, John Adams 45 

Opinion of the Chief Justice, John Jay 50 

Opinion of the Secretary of State, Thomas Jefferson 56 

Heads of consideration on the Navigation of the Mississippi, for 

Mr. Carmichael, by Thomas Jefferson 59 

Heads of consideration on the conduct we are to observe in the 

war between Spain and Great Britain, and particularly should 

the latter attempt the conquest of Louisiana and the Floridas. 

By Thomas Jefferson 65 

Hamilton to Washington, 15 September, 1790 68 

Opinion of the Secretary of the Treasury, Alexander Hamilton . 69 

Opinion of the Secretary of War, Henry Knox 103 

Index 107 

(V) 



INTRODUCTION. 



The interest of the papers included in these pages lies in 
the light they throw upon the first question of diplomacy, 
which confronted the newly constituted government of the 
United States. During the Revolution diplomatic relations 
with European powers had been confined to offers of alli- 
ances, of commercial reciprocity and requests for financial 
aid ; but the net result had been a treaty of alliance with 
France, which led to important results for the revolting col- 
onies ; a treaty of commerce with the same nation, that was 
entirely inoperative, thanks to the network of protective 
duties and prohibitions that closed the French ports to out- 
side traders ; and a few parchments involving contracts with 
other nations and supposed to contain concessions that might 
in certain contingencies become of value, but rather from 
their moral and political influence, as involving a recognition 
of the independence of America, than from any actual bonds 
of interest, political or commercial. Nor had the foreign 
relations of the States improved during the years from the 
treaty of peace in 1 783, to the promulgation of the new 
constitution and the establishment of a central government. 
Great Britain recognized the independence of the new 
nation, but refused to treat with it politically or commer- 
cially under formal exchange of ministers or a commercial 
treaty. The laws of trade and the rigid laws of the mer- 
cantile system gave the trade of America into British hands ; 

(7) 



8 

and, enjoying a natural monopoly, the British ministry saw 
no good reason for jeopardizing actual profit by suggesting 
changes that might prove injurious. To purchase by con- 
cession what they were already in the full enjoyment of, was 
not recognized as good policy ; nor was it more agreeable 
to them to open diplomatic relations that could not but lead 
to embarrassing controversies. There were charges of bad 
faith in the execution or rather evasion of the terms of the 
treaty of 1783, which could be judged of only by a tedious, 
difficult and extremely delicate weighing of claims on both 
sides. The Revolution in France had disarranged the rela- 
tions of that people with the outside world, and already in 
America a feeling was engendered that a too close connec- 
tion with that country might not be safe or expedient for 
the American interests. With Spain, there were still the 
embarrassing claims and denials attending the free naviga- 
tion of the Mississippi ; while the problem of public credit 
was intimately connected with the relations between the 
United States and their creditors — France and Holland. 

This unsatisfactory condition of diplomatic relations was 
emphasized by the geographical bounds of the new nation. 
On the north was the English province of Canada, posses- 
sion of which was long the object of the Continental Con- 
gress, and scattered within American territory were a num- 
ber of fortified posts held and garrisoned by the British, in 
direct contradiction to the terms of the treaty of peace. 
To the south were the possessions of Spain, for whom the 
Arnericans had little affection because of the hesitating and 
half-hearted assistance given during the war, and because of 
the complications raised in the subsequent negotiations for 
the navigation rights of the Mississippi. When Spain in 



1 7^3 obtained both Florida and Louisiana, the Spanish gov- 
ernment " aimed at excluding the United States, not France, 
from the gulf," * and she had little compunction in showing 
how little regard she intended to have for the wishes of the 
new republic, whose very institutions implied a menace to 
her colonial possessions in America. The Count de Florida 
Blanca, now supreme in the conduct of the foreign relations 
of Spain, was opposed to ceding any privileges asked, much 
less to recognizing any rights claimed by the Americans, 
touching the Mississippi. Smarting under the slight in- 
flicted by the treaty of i 783, which by a secret article looked 
to an r^nglish ownership of \\'est Florida, she notified Con- 
gress that until the question of boundaries — always vexatious 
and easily prolonged — had been determ.ined, the exclusive 
control of the Mississii)pi would be claimed by Spain. f 
As an earnest of her desire to accommodate any difference, 
Don Diego de Gardoqui was named "Encargado de Nego- 
cios," to reside near Congress and negotiate a settlement. 
The matter might have rested there for some time had it 
not been for the excitement raised in the western country. 
The arrival of Gardoqui gave reason to look for a removal 
of differences and the inhabitants of the west were quite 
willing to await the result. But months passed and nothing 
was published. Jay was bound by his instructions to insist 
upon the right of navigation of the Mississippi from ocean 
to source, while Gardoqui sought to establish the views of 
his master by securing the exclusion of all nations — Ameri- 
cans included — from that part of the river that ran through 
his, then undefined, territory. Annoying matters were con- 

* Henry Adams, History of the U>iited Stales. I, 333. 
f 25 June, 1784. 

2 



lO 

tinually arising : the unlawful occupation by Green ; and his 
followers of Spanish territory, an act promptly disavowed by 
Georgia ; the stoppage of traders at Natchez ; the question 
of indebtedness to Spain ; the complaints made by Indian 
tribes ; and what must have been most galling to Jay, the 
secret article of the treaty with Great Britain. At length, in 
August, 1786, Jay notified Congress that no treaty could be 
framed if the navigation right was insisted upon, and pro- 
posed to yield the claim for a period of twenty-five or 
thirty years, before the end of which the privilege, he 
thought, could hardly become of importance.* 

To Madison, always firm in insisting on maintaining to 
the utmost the claims against Spain, such a concession was 
almost criminal. 

" Passing by the other Southern States, figure to yourself 
the effect of such a stipulation on the Assembly of Virginia, 
already jealous of northern politics, and which will be com- 
posed of about thirty members from the western waters ; of 
a majority of others attached to the western country from 
interests of their own, of their friends, or their constituents ; 
and of many others who, though indifferent to Mississippi, 
will zealously play off the disgust of their friends against 
Federal measures. Figure to yourself its effect on the 
people at large on the western waters, who are impatiently 
waiting for a favorable result to the negotiation of Gardoqui, 
and who will consider themselves as sold by their Atlantic 
brethren. Will it be an unnatural consequence if they con- 

* " With respect to the Spaniards, I do not think the navigation of 
the Mississippi is an object of great importance to us at present ; and 
when the banks of the Ohio and the fertile plauis of the western country 
get thickly inhabited, the people^ will embrace the advantages which 
nature affords them in spite of all o[>po>ition.'' Waskiii^/on to Roch- 
ambeau, 7 September, 17S5. 



II 

sider themselves absolved from every Federal tie, and court 
some protection for their betrayed rights ? This protection 
will appear more attainable from the maritime power of 
Britain than from any other quarter ; and Britain will be 
more ready than any other nation to seize an opportunity of 
embroiling our affoirs. ... I should rather su}j})ose that 
he [the S])anish minister] means to work a total separation 
of interest and affection between western and eastern set- 
tlements, and to foment the jealousy between eastern and 
southern States. By the former, the population of the 
western country, it may be expected, will be checked, and 
the Mississippi so far secured ; and, by both, the general 
security of Spanish America be promoted."* 

This expression of an extreme view was actually a very 
accurate forecast of what did occur, so far as it applied to 
the inhabitants of the western country. A rough popula- 
tion, having no sentimental ties that could bind them to 
home or state, by necessity often trespassers or aggressors, 
using force to obtain what they thought belonged to them, 
adventurous and restless, easily influenced by a desire for 
gain that need not resj^ect the shadowy claims of a govern- 
ment incapable of enforcing them, and captivated by the 
energy and promises of demagogues, it was not to be ex- 
pected that they would fret long under the restraints imposed 
upon them by Spain, acting through her governors on the 
Mississippi. Retaliation was the readiest weapon at hand. 
Green, who had already figured as the Governor of a State 
parcelled out of Spanish territory, came again to the front, 
and another adventurer, Clark, in return for a seizTire by the 
Spanish at Natchez, rifled a Spanish trader's store at Vincen- 
nes. If the Americans were not permitted to trade down 

* ULii/isoii to Jefferson, 12 August, 1786. 



12 

the river, it was urged the Spaniards should not trade up. 
And a vigorously expressed protest now appeared which did 
much to excite a public feeling against the Spaniards, as well 
as against the Congress : 

COPY OF A LETTER FROM A GENTLEMAN AT THE FALI^ OF OHIO 
TO HIS FRIEND IN NEW ENGLAND, DATED DECEMBER 4, I 786. 

Dear Sir : Politics, which a few months ago were scarcely 
thought of, are now sounded aloud in this part of the world, 
and discussed by almost every person. 'J'he late commer- 
cial treaty with Spain, in shutting up, as it is said, the navi- 
gation of the Mississippi for the term of twenty-five years, 
has given this western country a universal shock, and struck 
its inhabitants with amazement. Our foundation is affected ; 
it is therefore necessary that every individual exert himself 
to apply a remedy. To sell and make us vassals to the 
merciless Spaniards is a grievance not to be borne. The 
Parliamentary acts which occasioned our revolt from Great 
Britain were not so barefaced and intolerable. To give us 
the Uberty of transporting our effects down the river to New 
Orleans, and then be subject to the Spanish laws and impo- 
sitions, is an insult upon our understanding. We know, by 
woful experience, that it is in their power, when once there^ 
to take our produce at any price they please. Large quan- 
tities of flour, tobacco, meal, &c., have been taken there the 
last summer, and mostly confiscated : those who had per- 
mits from their Governor were obliged to sell at a price he 
was pleased to state, or subject themselves to lose the whole. 
Men of large property are already ruined by their policy. 
What benefit can you on the Atlantic shores receive from 
this act? The Spaniards, from the amazing resources of 
this river, can supply all their own markets at a much lower 
price than you possibly can. Though this country has been 
settling but about six years, and that in the midst of an in- 
veterate enemy, and most of the first adventurers fallen a 
prey to the savages, and although the emigration to this 



13 

country is so rapid that tlie internal market is very great, 
yet the quantity of produce they now have on hand is im- 
mense. Flour and pork are now selling here at twelve 
shillings the hundred ; beef in proportion ; any quantities of 
Indian corn can be had at ninepence per bushel. Three 
times the quantity of tobacco and corn can be raised on an 
acre here that can be within the settlement on the east side 
of the mountains, and with less cultivation. It is, there- 
fore, rational to su])pose that, in a very few years, the vast 
bodies of water in those rivers will labor under the immense 
weight of the produce of this rich and fertile country, and 
Spanish ships be unable to convey it to market. Do you 
think to prevent the emigration from a barren country, 
loaded with taxes and impoverished with debts, to the most 
luxurious and fertile soil in the world? Vain is the thought 
and presumptuous the supposition. You may as well en- 
deavor to prevent the fishes from gathering on a bank in 
the sea which affords them plenty of nourishment. Shall the 
best and largest part of the United States be uncultivated, a 
nest for savages and beasts of prey ? Certainly not. Prov- 
idence has designed it for some nobler purposes. This is 
convincing to every one who beholds the many advantages 
and pleasing prospects of this country. Here is a soil 
richer to appearance than can possibly be made by art ; 
large plains and meadows, without the labor of hands, suffi- 
cient to support millions of cattle summer and winter ; cane, 
which is also a fine nourishment for- them, without bounds. 
The spontaneous production of this coimtry surpasses your 
imagination ; consequently I see nothing to prevent our 
herds being as numerous here, in time, as they are in the 
Kingdom of Mexico. Our lands to the northward of Ohio, 
for the produce of wheat, &c., will, I think, vie with the 
Island of Sicily. Shall all this country now be cultivated 
entirely for the use of the Spaniards? Shall we be their 
bondmen, as the children of Israel were to the Egyptians? 
Shall one part of the United States be slaves while the other 
is free? Human nature shudders at the thought, and free- 



14 

men will despise those who could be so mean as to even 
contemplate on so vile a subject. 

Our situation is as bad as it possibly can be ; therefore, 
every exertion to retrieve our circumstances must be manly, 
eligible, and just. 

We can raise twenty thousand troops this side the Alle- 
ghany and Appalachian mountains ; and the annual increase 
of them by emigration from other parts is from two to four 
thousand. 

We have taken all the goods belonging to the Spanish 
merchants of post Vincennes and the Illinois, and are de- 
termined they shall not trade up the river, provided they 
will not let us trade down it. Preparations are now making 
here (if necessary) to drive the Spaniards from their settle- 
ments at the mouth of the Mississippi. In case we are not 
countenanced and succored by the United States, (if we 
need it,) our allegiance will be thrown off, and some other 
Power applied to. Great Britain stands ready with open 
arms to receive and support us ; they have already offered 
to open their resources for our supplies. When once re- 
united to them, '' farewell, a long farewell, to all your 
boasted greatness;" the province of Canada and the inhabi- 
tants of these waters, of themselves, in time, will be able to 
conquer you. You are as ignorant of this country as Great 
Britain was of America. These hints, if rightly improved, 
may be of some service ; if not, blame yourselves for the 
neglect. 

The anti-federal sentiments shown in such expressions of 
opinion naturally disturbed Madison, and he returned to 
the Continental Congress with the intention of forcing the 
question of the Mississippi, now by a legislative trick, as he 
thought, left almost entirely in the hands of Jay. He was 
supported in this by the strong feeling of the Virginia Leg- 
islature, asserting in unmistakable language the importance 
of acquiring the right of navigating the river. But he was 



15 

opposed by the indifference, or rather the interest, of the 
Eastern and some of the Middle States. To them, the 
navigation of the western river meant nothing ; for they were 
more intent upon acquiring commercial privileges in the 
Spanish West Indies, and were willing, almost eager, to se- 
cure these at the expense of the claims applying to the Mis- 
sissippi. It was on the vote of the four Eastern States, with 
the assistance of New York, New Jersey and Pennsylvania, 
that the restriction imposed upon Jay in his negotiations, of 
insisting upon this right, had been rejoealed ; and this vote 
was based upon such motives as were not hkely to be 
changed. For New York saw in the west a rival to her 
commercial interests, and Pennsylvania, if not controlled, 
was at least influenced, by the same jealousy. In 1786 the 
feeling was so strong as to produce a talk of separation of 
the Middle and Eastern States from the Southern, should a 
determination of the matter be forced, and conclude to the 
injury of the wishes of the former.* Yet, as Madison said, 
would the Eastern States have remained quiet under a ces- 
sion by Congress of the fishery rights for commercial privi- 
leges applying to tobacco ? To yield the navigation rights 
in exchange for liberty to export fish and flour into the 
Spanish colonies involved, in his view, as great a sectional 
sacrifice, the South and West being sacrificed to the North, f 

* Monroe to Madison, 3 September, 1786. 

j- Early in his negotiations, Gardoqui had said that as the Spanish 
King "has no occasion for tiie codfish, oil, salmon, grain, flour, rice, 
nor otlier productions, he may, considering the right which obliges his 
subjects to provide themselves by their own industry or other useful and 
important means, find it convenient to prohibit them, to remind this 
nation [?. e. the United States] at present, as a friend, that they have 
no treaty." Ganh-iqiti lo Jay, 25 May, 1786. 



i6 

The threatening situation in the West, however, did pro- 
duce a change of sentiment. New Jersey instructed her 
delegates in Congress to labor for the navigation, while a 
change in the Pennsylvania representation gave her vote to 
the South, Rhode Island, believing an extensive land spec- 
ulation was under the apparent indifference of her New 
England sister States, added her influence to the same side. 
Gorham of Massachusetts bluntly expressed the selfishness 
of the East by avowing his wish to close the Mississippi, that 
the inducements to move into the western country might be 
lessened, and the drain on the population and wealth of the 
Atlantic States thereby decreased. In spite of this, the 
Spanish agent gained the impression that the general drift 
of American policy was opposed to insisting on the right, 
and he urged this upon his court. * Here the matter rested, 
for the institution of a new government took it out of the 
hands of the confederation, and gave it, with a legacy of 
other undetermined questions, to the newly formed admin- 
istration of President Washington. 

In the VVashbigton Papers are full summaries in the 
President's writing of the correspondence between Jay and 
Gardoqui, but without note or comment. Nor is there to 
be found any note or memorandum to show whether there 
was any special incident in the west, or on the Mississippi, 
or in Spain, that should have brought this question before 

*" It appears to me now, as it has long done, that they think here a 
free port on the Mississippi will satisfy the wishes of the Americans, 
and on that idea ground their expectations that the instructions sent in 
autumn last to Mr. Gardoqui will enable that gentleman to bring the 
negotiations to a speedy termination." Car?nic/iaei to Jay, 29 April, 
178S. 



17 

the Cabinet. In Augnst, 1790, the matter was taken up, 
and the various steps taken are detailed in the following 
pages. 

The instnnnents at hand for conducting a negotiation 
were few and imperfect, Gardoqui had returned to Spain, 
leaving his secretary Jose Ignacio de Viar, in charge, while 
Carmichael, as merely charge at the Court of Madrid, 
found it difficult to secure access to Florida Blanca, and 
was compelled to depend more upon a certain "back-door" 
influence than upon his own activity. The United States 
had no diplomatic representative in England, but Gouvemeur 
Morris was there in an unofficial capacity, seeking to pave 
the way for a settlement of differences and an exchange of 
ministers. Jefferson, whose long service abroad would have 
rendered his assistance valuable in a negotiation, was the 
Secretary of State, and forced to depend upon such agents 
as the infant diplomatic system of the government were sup- 
plied with. In Portugal, closely connected with Spain in 
everything but policy, there was no American representative, 
and in France there was nothing higher than a chai'ge 
d'' affaires. On the other hand, the Netherlands was the 
only European power that had a minister resident regularly 
accredited to the United States, and France was the only 
power that could supply a means of diplomatic communica- 
tion so high as a charge (f affaires — Otto. While the 
European courts were fully cognizant of every step taken by 
the American agents in Europe, and had an almost imme- 
diate knowledge of all that they proposed, Jefferson acted 
on imperfect knowledge, gained often from doubtful sources, 
and secured long after the events described had happened, 



l8 

when new combinations might have produced new situa- 
tions. Six weeks were required for the passage of a letter 
from London to New York, nine weeks were a fair run 
from Paris, and sometimes nineteen weeks elapsed between 
the delivery of a letter by a charge and its receipt by Jeffer- 
son. Nor was this the only drawback, for it was reasonably 
certain that before Carmichael's letters could leave Spain, or 
Jefferson's be delivered to him, the Spanish court had read 
them and were perfectly cognizant of what they contained. 
Even the cypher used between these two was known to it. 
A new danger to the United States appeared in the pros- 
pect of war between Spain and Great Britain, in the event 
of which a contest between the two powers in America was 
most probable, as the weakness of the Spanish colonies 
offered a tempting prize to the power of a nation almost 
supreme on the ocean. The Spaniards had laid claim to 
nearly the whole of the western coasf of America, from 
Cape Horn to the sixtieth degree of north latitude, and had 
watched with a feeling of jealousy, aggravated by a sense of 
injury, the establishment of a British settlement in Nootka 
Sound, on Vancouver's Island. This inlet of the sea had 
been first explored by Captain Cook in one of his voyages, 
and, on the establishment of the English in India, became 
a trading station, colonized by the English and recognized 
by grants of land from the natives. After three years of 
undisturbed possession, the little settlement was surprised 
by the arrival of two Spanish ships of war from Mexico, 
which seized an English merchant vessel — the Iphigenia — 
imprisoned her crew, looted the vessel, and pulling down 
the British flag on the settlement, raised that of Spain, and 
subsequently treated all comers as intruders. 



19 

Spain, while recognizing that she had committed an ag- 
gravated insult upon the English flag, was at first inclined to 
to assume a high position, demanding that British subjects 
should in the future refrain from trespassing on Spanish ter- 
ritory ; but, in consideration of the "ignorance" of those 
who had landed at Nootka, the seized vessels were released. 
Such a message was little suited to the disposition of Pitt or 
of the English people, and in default of further reparation 
from Spain, war must ensue, for which extensive prepara- 
tions were made on both sides. 

The Spanish were collecting their fleets at Cadiz and 
Ferrol, and the king on May 5, 1790, announced to Par- 
liament the prospect of war. A credit was given, but litUe 
opposition appeared ; and while a peaceable settlement was 
sought by sending a negotiator — Mr. Alleyne Fitzherbert* 
— to Madrid, with instructions to insist on a full reparation 
to the injured, before consenting even to a discussion of the 
abstract rights involved, the collection of an army, fleets and 
munitions of war was actively pushed, and plans formed for 
attacking Spain in the West Indies and South America. 

The news of the King's message reached the United States 
in June, and was, as Jefferson termed it, "interesting news." 
The aggressiveness of Great Britain was acknowledged. 
"You will see by the papers enclosed that Great Britain is 
itching for war. I do not see how one can be avoided, un- 
less Spain should be frightened into concessions. The con- 

* Fitzherbert had been sent to Paris in 1782 to negotiate the treaty of 
peace Ijctween Great IJritain and France and Spain ; and it was for his 
services in bringinjj to a successful end tlie negotiations with Spain on 
the Nootka question, that he was raised to the Irish peerage as Baron 
St. Helen's. 



sequences of such an event must have an im])ortant rela- 
tion to the affairs of the United States." * " It was evident 
they [the British Houses of Parliament] wotild accept 
nothing short of an extensive renunciation from Spain as to 
her American pretensions. Perhaps she is determined to 
be satisfied with nothing but war, dismemberment of the 
Spanish empire, and annihilation of her fleet. Nor does 
her countenance towards us clear up at all." f But there 
might be a compensation to America. " If the war between 
France and Spain takes place, I think France will inevit- 
ably be involved in it. In that case, I hope the new world 
will fatten on the follies of the old. If we can but establish 
the armed neutrahty for ourselves, we must become the 
carriers for all parties as far as we can raise vessels." J 
Washington, just recovered from an illness that had almost 
proved fatal, made the first mention of the possibility of 
the Floridas being involved in the threatened war, but in- 
sisted on the policy of neutrality. " It seems to be our 
policy to keep in the situation in which nature has placed 
us, to observe a strict neutrality, and to furnish others with 
those good things of subsistence which they may want, and 
which our fertile land abundantly produces, if circumstances 
and events will permit us to do so. . . . Gradually recover- 
ing from the distresses in which the war left us, patiently 
advancing in our task of civil government, unentangled in 
the crooked politics of Europe, wanting scarcely anything 
but the full navigation of the Mississippi (which we must 



* Madison to PentUeton, 22 June, 1790. 

\ Jefferson to Monroe, 20 June, 1790. 

\ Jefferson to E. li ut ledge, ^]\.\]y, 1790. 



have, and as certainly shall have as we remain a nation), 
I have supposed, that, with the undeviating exercise of a 
just, steady and pnident national policy, we shall be the 
gainers, whether the powers of the old world may be in 
peace or war, but more especially in the latter case. In 
that case our importance will certainly increase, and our 
friendship be courted. Our dispositions will not be indif- 
ferent to j5ritain or Spain. Why will not Spain be wise and 
liberal at once ? It would be easy to annihilate all causes 
of quarrels between that nation and the United States at this 
time. At a future period, that may be far from being a fact. 
Should a war take place between Great Britain and Spain, I 
conceive, from a great variety of concurring circumstances, 
there is the highest probability that the Floridas will soon be 
in the possession of the former."* 

In these phrases were compressed the policy of the gov- 
ernment : neutrality, if possible, and an attempt to make 
the difference between the European powers a means of 
obtaining concessions from Spain long sought for. "The 
part we are to act," wrote Jefferson to Carmichael, "is un- 
certain, and will be difficult. The unsettled state of our dis- 
. pute with Spain, may give a turn to it very different from 
what we would wish," — and Col. David Humphreys was sent 
to Madrid to aid Carmichael, bearing a sketch of general 
matters to be considered in the negotiation, drawn up by 
Jeff'erson.t In introducing Humphreys to Carmichael, 
Jefferson wrote : — 

"With this information, written and oral, you will be en- 

* IVashiti^tou to Lafayette, II August, 1790. 
•j- Post. 



22 

abled to meet the minister in conversations on the subiect 
of the navigation of the Mississippi, to which we wish you 
to lead his attention immediately. Impress him thoroughly 
with the necessity of an early and even an immediate settle- 
ment of this matter, and of a return to the field of negotia- 
tion for this purpose ; and though it must be done delicately, 
yet he must be made to understand unequivocally, that a 
resumption of the negotiation is not desired on our part, 
unless he can determine, in the first opening of it, to yield 
the immediate and full enjoyment of that navigation. . , . 
It is impossible to answer for the forbearance of our western 
citizens. We endeavor to quiet them with the expectation 
of an attainment of their rights by peaceable means. But 
should they, in a moment of impatience, hazard others, 
there is no saying how far we may be led ; for neither them- 
selves nor their rights will ever be abandoned by us. 

"You will be pleased to observe, that we press these mat- 
ters warmly and firmly, under this idea, that the war be- 
tween Spain and (Treat Britian will be begun before you re- 
ceive this ; and such a moment must not be lost. But should 
an accommodation take place, we retain, indeed, the same 
object and the same resolutions unalterably ; but your discre- 
tion will suggest, that in that event they must be pressed 
more softly, and that patience and persuasion must temper 
your conferences, till either these may prevail, or some 
other circumstance turn up, which may enable us to use 
other means for the attainment of an object which we are 
determined, in the end, to obtain at every risk."* 

In the event of war the good offices of France, to assist in 
the negotiations at Madrid, were to be asked, j 

In his rough draft of " Heads of Consideration " for Mr. 
Carmichael, drawn up by Jefferson 2 August, 1 790, the pos- 
sibility of a necessary coalition with Great Britain against 

* Jefferson to Carinichael, 2 August, 1790. 

\ Jefferson to William Short, lO August, 1790. 



Spain was considered. Tlie inhabitants of the western 
country required a vent for their surplus products, and the 
natural vent was down the Mississippi. To deny the privi- 
lege of navigating that river to the mouth to the Americans, 
was to invite a complication not easily to be solved. Either 
the federal government must take up the cause of the 
western people and by force or negotiation obtain conces- 
sions from Spain ; or it must reduce the Kentuckians to an 
acquiescence in the arbitrary decrees of Spain ; or it must 
consent to a separation of the western territory. To aban- 
don the west or reduce it to obedience was equally imprac- 
ticable, and it remained only to obtain concesssions. If by 
force, the United States could act alone or in conjunction 
with Great Ikitain"with a view to partition," and in the 
latter case Jefferson noted : 

"'l"he Floridas (inchulK N. Orleans) would be assigned 
to us. Louisiana (or all the country on the west? waters of 
y? Missi.) to them. We confess that such an alliance is 
not what we would wish, because it may eventually lead us 
into embarrassing situations as to our best friend, and put 
the power of two n'bors into y*^ hands of one. L'.' Lans- 
downe has declared he gave the Floridas to Spain rather 
than to the U. S., as a bone of discord with the H. of Bour- 
bon, and of reunion with Gr, Br. Connolly's attempt (as 
well as other fiicts) prove they keep it in view."* 

The English and Spanish negotiations were continued 
through the summer. On June 4th the Spanish ministry 
declared that the release of the vessels had been a sufficient 
reparation for actual injury, and there only remained the 



*Thi.s (locuniunt is printed in full /'osL 



question of right to be determined, a question that the in- 
structions to Fitzherbert prevented hmi from discussing 
under such a declaration. The English demanded a res- 
toration of the vessels, a full indemnity for the seizure, and 
a reparation for the insult committed on the English flag. 
Count de Florida Blanca replied that he would grant the 
satisfaction demanded, on condition that the damages were 
determined by an impartial judge, and that all the rights of 
Spain should be positively reserved. (June i8.) England 
continued her preparations and called upon Holland to assist 
her, as she was bound to by treaty. In response a Dutch 
fleet joined Admiral Howe at Portsmouth, and as a counter- 
movement Spain collected a fleet at Cadiz. 

Nor did Spain stand alone in the matter, for by the 
pacte de famille France was bound to give her assistance in 
an offensive or defensive war, and notice that such aid 
might become necessary was served upon the French min- 
istry. Coming as it did, when France was in the throes of 
revolution, it naturally produced some difference of opinion, 
with which questions of constitutional policy were com- 
mingled. A few months before, Mirabeau had induced the 
Assembly to decide that while the right of peace and war 
belonged to the nation, war could be declared only by a 
decree of the Assembly based upon a formal and pressing 
{iiccessaire) proposal of the king, and approved by him. 
The legislature, by controlling the supplies, could at any 
time, even in the progress of a war, impose the necessity of 
making peace upon the king. Such a decision need not 
have proved embarrassing had not the country been bound 
to perform certain acts, under certain contingencies, and 
apparently without the power of questioning their justice or 



expediency. The "Society of 1789," where, as in the 
" Chib des Jacobins," questions of iniblic poHcy were dis- 
cussed before being submitted to the Assembly, declared 
that it was impossible to maintain the "fomily compact" 
under the existing constitution. " They say that they cannot 
adhere to engagem.ents which never were just, which are 
incompatible with the rights of man and the principles of a 
free constitution, and which render the nation dependent 
upon the will of one man, and that man a stranger. They 
declare such treaties between kings to be conspiracies 
against the people of their respective countries."* 

So distinctly colored as was this declaration with the 
temper of the time as to be almost grotesque, Mirabeau 
was too shrewd a politician not to recognize that it repre- 
sented such a share of public opinion that it could not 
wisely be ignored. He knew the advantage of preserving 
the Spanish alliance, yet that alliance must be modified to 
make it conform better with the prevalent ideas of the uni- 
versal brotherhood of man, and also to render it palatable 
to those who looked upon it as an instnmient of monarchy 
— a euphemism for tyranny. Besides, France herself had 
important colonial interests in the West Indies, whose safety 
would be jeopardized by a rupture of peace with Great 
Britain. Spain had served notice that she would look else- 
where for alliances, should France fail her, and demanded 
an immediate state of the conduct the ministers intended to 
pursue. It was Mirabeau who drew up the report express- 
ing the opinion of the Comite Diplomatique on the com- 
pact, and who laid it before the Assembly on the 25th of 
August. Earl Gower wrote of it : — 

* Dispatches of Earl Gower, 9 July, 1790. 



26 

" It consisted in advising the Assembly to empower them 
to examine that treaty in order to form out of it a national 
compact, by leaving out all the articles offensive, and at the 
same time to request the king to order his minister at the 
Court of Madrid to enter into a negotiation with the Spanish 
ministry upon those grounds. They proposed two decrees : 

" I St. That all existing treaties shall be maintained by the 
French nation until it shall have revised and modified them. 

" 2nd. That, before the thorough examination of treaties 
which the nation may think proper to continue or alter, the 
king shall be requested to make known to all the powers 
with which France is connected that justice and the love of 
peace are the bases of the French constitution ; that the 
nation cannot admit in her treaties any stipulations which 
are not purely defensive and commercial. That accordingly 
they request the king to inform his Catholic Majesty that 
the French nation, in taking all proper measures to maintain 
peace, will abide by the engagements which her government 
has contracted with Spain. That they also desire the king 
to order his ministers to negotiate accordingly with the 
Court of Spain, and to commission thirty ships of the line, 
eight of which at least to be fitted out in the ports of the 
Mediterranean, 

"This report was taken into consideration yesterday 
morning, and, after a short debate, the Assembly decreed 
that they would abide by the defensive and commercial 
engagements which the government has contracted with 
Spain ; that the king should be desired to order his ambas- 
sadors to negotiate with the ministers of the Catholic king 
in order to strengthen, by a national treaty, tyes useful to 
both people, and to fix with precision and clearness all stip- 
ulations which may not be entirely conformable to the views 
of general peace and to the principles of justice, which 
shall always be the politics of the French ; and also, taking 
into consideration the armaments of the different nations of 
Europe, their progressive increase, the security of the 
French colonies and commerce, they decreed that the king 



27 

shall be desired to order into commission forty-five ships of 
the line, with a proportionable number of frigates and small 
vessels." 

These acts, a curious mixtiire of politics and sentiment, 
were what appeared on the surface, and while seeking to 
retain the expectancy of Spain for aid by a vote for shij)s, 
delay was also the object. Nor was this all. The prepara- 
tions of I'>ngland on so large a scale, to secure what was 
regarded as a very disproportionate end, could not but 
arouse the suspicions of the continental nations that some 
other object was to be attained. Late in July the Journal 
des Dibats et Dccrets said : " II est impossible aussi que ces 
armemens regard 1' Espagne seule. II est bien probable 
qu'elles mcnacent egalement les possessions Franc^oises."* 
Such a view was promptly disavowed by the French minis- 
try ; but England knew the terms of the family compact, and 
could not fail to be irritated by the vote of the Assembly 
to increase the navy, though assured by M. Montmorin that 
the increase would be very gradual, and by both M. Mont- 
morin and M. Neckar of the desire of France for peace. 
Earl Gower was instructed to notify the French ministry 
that " any assistance offered to Spain will oblige the British 
Cabinet to adopt such measures as may be most likely to 
render that assistance ineffectual ;" and to still further sup- 
port r^ngland's position, Hugh Elliott was sent on a secret 
mission to France. It is to Mr. Oscar Browning that our 
knowledge of his mission is due, and we quote his note : — 

* Even in England the good faitli of the ministry in asking for a 
credit to arm against Spain was questioned, for there had already ex- 
isted a belief that an expedition to the liaitic was on foot. 



28 

" Pitt was using the strongest and most haughty language 
to compel Spain to submit to us, but if France joined her 
these remonstrances would be ineffectual, and a European 
war would break out. Mirabeau was not a minister, and 
therefore Lord Gower could have no communication with 
him, but he was chairman of the comiti- diploynatiqiie of the 
National Assembly, in whose hands, rather than in those of 
the minister, lay the issues of peace and war. It was import- 
ant to secure that Mirabeau should not only maintain the 
principle that France was not bound to assist Spain under 
the present circumstances, but should do all he could to 
urge Spain to submit to the demands of England. If' 
Elliott was authorized to use any other arguments to Mira- 
beau of a more delicate or secret nature, it would be a 
reason for the correspondence having completely disap- 
peared." 

Whatever were the arguments used, they were so effective 
that the popular party signified to Lord Gower "their 
earnest desire to use their influence with the Court of Mad- 
rid in order to bring it to accede to the just demands of his 
Majesty, and, if supported by us, I am induced to believe 
they will readily prefer an English alliance to a Spanish 
compact."* 

Count de Florida Blanca in the meantime was losing 
heart. His efforts to secure the aid of France had resulted 
in an apparent acquiescence, it is true, but the widespread 
disaffection and mutiny in the French fleet and army would 
make the aid an element of danger rather than of strength. 
He had coquetted with the United States by throwing out a 
hint that the right to navigate the Mississippi might be con- 
ceded, t — this to prevent the possible alliance between the 

* Goivers Despatches, 22 October, 1790. 

•j-On September 21st, Hamilton wrote to Washington speaking of a 



29 

United States and Great Britain. His own position was 
precarious, and to serve as a figure-head for executing the 
pohcy of another and irresponsible person, was not kind to 
his temper. He thought it best to yield. "Je me rends a 
vos conditions," he said to Fitzhebert, " non parce qu'elles 
sont justes, raais parce que j'y suis force. Si la France 
nous avait aide, je ne m'y serais jamais soumis, mais nous 
ne pouvons tout seuls nous mesures avec nous. Faites done 
ce que vous voulez." On the 28th October the convention 
was signed, "by which it was agreed that the lands and 
buildings of which British subjects had been dispossessed in 
North America should be restored to them ; that British 
subjects should not be disturbed or molested in carrying on 
their fisheries in the South Seas, or in making settlements 
for the purpose of commerce on the coasts of those seas in 
places not already occupied ; and that on the other hand the 

letter from Daniel Parker, dated London, tlie I2th of July, which men- 
tioned that " he liad just seen M. de Miranda, who had recently con- 
versed with the Marquis del Campo, from whom he learned that the 
Court of Spain had acceded to our right of navigating the Mississippi. 
Col. Smith has also read to me a passage out of another letter of the 6lh 
of July, which mentions that orders had been sent to the Viceroy of 
Mexico and the Governor of New Orleans not to interrupt the passage 
of vessels of the United States through that river." 

On September 22d Lear, in a letter to tlie President, announced it a 
based on " pretty direct information," and the letter of Gouverneu r 
Morris dated 2 July, reporting that the concession was "matter of com 
men report," must have been in the President's hands for some time 
Further than this, Lear in New York and King in Boston claimed to 
have authentic information of a full accommodation between Grea 
Britain and Spain — a premature conclusion, based upon mere rumors. 
See also Humphreys' letter, /(?.fA 



30 

king of Britain should engage to take the most effectual 
measures that these fisheries should not be made a pretext 
for illicit trade with the Spanish settlements ; and with that 
view it was further stipulated that British subjects should 
not carry on their fisheries within ten leagues from any part 
of the coast already occuj^ed by Spain."* 

This convention was used by the United States as a pre- 
cedent when urging its claims in the Oregon question. 

Congress adjourned on August 12th, and on the 15th the 
President, accompanied by Jefferson, started on a journey 
to Rhode Island which occupied about ten days. On their 
return to New York the President addressed a series of 
questions to the Vice-President, the Chief Justice and the 
three members of his Cabinet, on the position to be taken 
should Lord Dorchester,! the Governor of Quebec, wish to 
strike the Spanish colonies by sending troops from Detroit, 
through the territory of the United States. It is the replies 
to these questions that are printed in the following pages, 
and constitute the first discussion in diplomacy by Washing- 
ton's advisers that we have a record of. The documents 
speak for themselves, and the subsequent events may now 
be described. Although such an application was never 
formally made, the replies have an interest when brought 
into comparison with Jefferson's negotiations with France 
and Spain during his presidency, which led up to the pur- 
chase of Louisiana. 

* Stanhope, Life of Pitt, II, 62. The convention determining the 
indemnity was made in February, 1793, and the port at Nooika was 
not evacuated by the Spanisli until 1795. 

f Better known as General Guy Carleton. He was created IJaron 
Dorchester in 1786. 



31 

Humphreys, after a tempestuous passnge of five weeks, 
reached London on the morning of October 14, and found 
that the confident tone the ministry had adopted in the 
summer had altered. A feeling prevailed that Spain was 
artfully ])\itting off a settlement while sounding the attitude 
of France, and the prospect of her assistance in case of 
actual war.* Still war seemed more probable than peace; 
the stock market was uncertain, insurance was at war prem- 
ium, the press gang was still at work, and all the usual ])rep- 
arations for war were being pushed. "While the powers of 
Europe are in such a political ferment, America is daily 
growing of more importance in their view. A report has 
prevailed in this place that Spain has lately made some 
declaration, with respect to conceding to the United States 
the free navigation of the Mississippi. I took considerable 
pains to trace it, and yesterday was told Col. t Miranda had 
seen it in a letter to the Spanish ambassador himself. My 
informant received the intelligence from Miranda." | Six 
Cherokee chiefs came to London, "as ambassadors from a 
nation which (according to the Enghsh printed commimi- 
cation) has 20,000 men in arms ready to assist G. Britain 
against Spain" — an assertion as ludicrous as it was prepos- 
terous. Up to the hour of his leaving England — 4 No- 
vember — Humphreys was unable to say whether the com- 
plication would terminate in peace or war, although the con- 
vention with Spain had then been signed nearly a week (28 
October), and the immediate end of his mission to Spain 

* Humphreys to the Secretary of State, London, 14 October, 1 790. 

\ Count. 

\, Humphreys to the Secretary of State, 20 October, 1 790. 



rendered abortive. On reaching Lisbon, two weeks later, 
he learned of the agreement, and in vague terms of the 
details covered. 

Humphreys, however, determined to go to Madrid, and 
leaving Lisbon on the 3d of December he reached the 
Spanish capital on the 17th, after a tedious journey, travel- 
ling from daylight to dark, and making but one stop about 
an hour in the middle of the day. The convention was 
then being "partially circulated," printed on a single sheet 
in Spanish and French,* but for nearly two weeks the 
special messenger sent no dispatch to the American Secre- 
tary ot State. On the 3d of January, 1791, he broke silence 
and in cipher wrote to Jefferson : — 

[In cipher] 

Madrid, 3 January, 1791. 
I have had, sir, many conversations with Mr. Carmichael 
on the subject of your letter to him. If it had arrived early 
in summer, he thinks we might have obtained all our wishes. 
Then the critical state of affairs induced the Comte de 
Florida Blanca to throw out those general assertions that we 
should have no reason to complain of the conduct of this 
Court, with respect to the Mississippi, which gave rise to 
the report its navigation was opened. That minister had 
intimations from del Campo of the conferences between Mr. 
Morris and the Duke of Leeds, which occasioned him to 
say with warmth to Mr. Carmichael, now is your time to 
make a treaty with England. Fitzherbert availed himself 
of those conferences to create apprehensions that the 
Americans would aid his nation in case of war. Long time 
the conduct of Spain was fluctuating and undecided. After 
a variety of circumstances (which Mr. Carmichael has ex- 
plained in his dispatches that have miscarried, and which he 



*IIumphrey.s to the Secretary of State, Madrid, 18 December, 1790. 



will repeat in others by me) a convention was formed 
whereby the British gained substantially everything they at 
first demanded. Want of money to support a war and the 
Queen's intrigues, together with advice from the C'omte 
Montemorin that peace was essential to France, were prob- 
ably the principal causes which compelled Spain to yield 
the point after each side had tried which could hold out 
the longest. The preparations cost Spain sixteen millions 
dollars. Thus the crisis most favorable for the attainment 
of our wishes is past. Unless there is some secret article in 
the Convention by which England guarantees the ])osses- 
sions of Spain in America, resentment may \_indeciphc'rahle\ 
in the Spanish Court for having been obliged to receive the 
law. They may also desire to be in readiness for events. 
How far these or other motives may operate in producing 
change of system with respect to the United States, re- 
mains to be learnt from an adherence to the latter part of 
your instructions to Mr. Carmichael. 

'llie foct is clear that the United States are daily gaining 
political consideration in Europe. Spain, guided by narrow 
policy towards its colonies, fears the consequence of our 
increasing strength and resources. The Compte de Florida 
Blanca has been so long and so obstinately opposed to the 
admission of foreign vessels into the Gulf of Mexico, that 
the most he can ever be persuaded to do, will be to suffer 
somebody else to negotiate, to whom, if there be blame for 
inconsistency in poHcy, the foult may be imputed. But 
the Compte not being well with the Queen, loses credit ; 
and recent circumstances indicate that he is but the osten- 
sible, while le Rena (at the head of the finance) is the real 
minister. Mr. Carmichael thinks, that if the Compte will 
not consent to open a negotiation with liberal views, it may 
l)e possible to displace him and find a successor of better 
dispositions : that is, if the Queen lives, but she is ajjpre- 
hensive of dying in childbed next month, which event 
would give the Compte more weight than ever. Campo- 
manes, who is the head of the judicators, Compte de Aranda, 



34 

and many others, entertain just ideas with respect to our 
country. The first is high in influence and secretly an 
enemy to the Compte de Florida Blanca ; the last, at the 
head of opposition, will not come into ofifice himself, but, in 
case of a change of administration, some of his friends will 
succeed. Mr. Carmichael, being on terms of intimacy with 
the characters here, is certainly capable of effecting more at 
this Court than any other American. . . . 

Something also gives uneasiness to this Court. Affairs do 
not go well. Frequent councils are convened. The gov- 
ernment is feeble, jealous, mercenary and unpopular. The 
King is a well-disposed, passionate, weak man. The Queen 
(a shrewd, well-instructed woman, addicted to pleasure and 
expense) governs the kingdom. She is not beloved. Nor 
did either of them receive the usual acclamations of the 
people when they returned from their country residence last 
fall. The Queen has even been insulted, which makes her 
appear rarely in public. For this offense twelve washer- 
women have been confined, and their husbands banished 
the kingdom, because they petitioned for their release. 
Several natives of distinction have lately been exiled from 
the capital to the. provinces, among others the Comptesse of 
Galvez. Compte Segur, a Frenchman accused of being the 
author of a libel against the Queen, within a week past died 
of rigorous confinement. This government, alarmed, at the 
success of the revolution in France, shows great distrust 
and hatred of the French. Several have been arrested at 
midnight and hurried out of the country. People begin to 
think and even to speak in private circles freely. In some 
provinces dissatisfaction prevails on account of new taxes. 
Three regiments are just sent into Galhcia to quell those dis- 
turbances, where an attempt was made to assassinate the new 
general on the road. General Lacy (who commands at 
Barcelona and has been obliged to menace the city by turn- 
ing the cannon against it) is continually writing to Court 
for men and military supplies. Tho' the Spaniards in many 
places retain the appearance, habits and manners of a i)eople 



35 

who have but lately lost their liberty, yet affairs are not ripe 
for reformation, from want of leaders, information and 
means of combination. The utmost diligence is used to 
sup])ress intelligence from other countries. Notwithstanding 
I had the necessary passports, at the frontier town I was 
delayed a day and not permitted to proceed, until the 
officers of poUce had put my letters under cover to the 
police in Madrid. This having been done in my presence, 
they delivered them to me, with an apology for the strict- 
ness of their orders. On my arrival at Madrid, I went 
directly to Mr. Carmichael, and upon his application to the 
Compte de Florida Blanca, the letters (which had remained 
in my trunk under the seal of government,) were returned 
uno]:)ened into my hand. But notwithstanding all precau- 
tions, letters, newspapers and pamphlets come from France 
into this kingdom. Interesting paragraphs are copied, cir- 
culated, and read with avidity. . . . 

[In Cipher] 

Madrid, 15 January, 1791. 
Sir : I have employed my time here in communicating 
according to instructions the sentiments of the President on 
the navigation of the Mississippi, and other important points. 
Mr. Carmichael's ideas are just ; his exertions will be power- 
ful and unremitting to obtain the accomplishment of our 
desires before his departure from this country ; the task 
will now be difficult, if not impracticable, from the opinions 
which are impressed on this court. I fear these are rather 
riveted than impressed to the very substance of their former 
jealous policy. I learn from other good authority, as well as 
from Mr. Carmichael, that all the representations of Cardoqui 
(when minister in America) tended to excite a belief that 
the most respectable and influential people throughout the 
United States did not wish to have the navigation of the 
Mississippi opened for years to come, from an apprehension 
that such an event would weaken the government, and impov- 
erish the Atlantic States by emigrations. It was even pre- 



tended that none but a handful of settlers on the western 
waters, and a few inhabitants of the southern states, would 
acquiesce in the measure. 

At present affairs here are guided more by intrigue than 
by reason. So that no one can answer for the consequence 
of a negotiation. Means are used to bring our subject with 
advantage into discussion. The king is just gone to hunt 
for two days ; play is usual after the hoUdays ; his prime 
minister and the family ambassadors only attended him. 
Nothing can be ascertained until his return. 

It is not improbable a change of ministry may soon take 
place. The situation about the Court becomes every day 
more critical. Nor is it less so in the country. The night 
before last, twenty-two French and Italians were sent from 
Madrid under guard, out of the kingdom, for speaking too 
freely ; as was one Spanish Marquis to a distant province. 



For nine days longer Humphreys remained in Madrid in 
the character of a traveller, hoping that Carmichael could 
obtain an audience with Count Florida Blanca. Disap- 
pointed in this, he returned to Lisbon, leaving the conduct 
of whatever questions might arise in the hands of Car- 
michael. 

"As the business with which he is now charged requires 
to be managed with uncommon address and delicacy, I 
have advised him to seize some good occasion for obtaining 
a particular audience to explain our desires specifically, but 
in the most discreet manner, with the reasons and motives 
on which they are founded. And I have told him, that I 
apprehended the sooner this could be done, the better it 
would be ; since the affairs of Europe, far from being settled, 
may soon produce a crisis highly favorable to the promotion 
of our interests ; and since our western settlers cannot long 
brook delay. Hitherto he had only found a casual oppor- 
tunity (that is to say, immediately after my arrival) to sug- 



37 

gest to the minister, in general terms without abniptness, 
our sincere disposition to be connected with Sj)ain, in the 
most Uberal and friendly manner ; and for this ]nir])ose the 
apparent expediency of making arrangements resj)ecting 
the navigation of the Mississippi, before any ill adventures 
shall happen in that quarter."* 

^^'hat occurred immediately after Humphreys' departure 
is described in a letter that Carmichael wrote to Jefferson, 
interesting not only in connection with this special mission, 
but also as showing the difficulties under which Carmichael 
was placed while in Spain. 

Madrid, 24 January, 1791. 

Sir : Colonel Humphreys delivered to me your letter of 
the 6th of August on the iSth of the last month ; nothing 
could equal my astonishment in finding that I have been 
employing my time in a situation that has been for many 
years disagreeable, so little to my own credit or to the sat- 
isfaction of my own country. 

The only method which I could take in the moment was 
to show to a man who justly merits the confidence placed in 
him, the pains I had taken for information, and how im- 
probable it was that I should spend my time and even my 
own fortune to procure intelligence without transmitting the 
materials which I obtained with great difficulty and consid- 
erable expense, that at least prove my zeal, tho' perhaps not 
my talents. 

The next object will be to forward copies of all the dis- 
patches which I find by your letter have not reached the 
Department. I cannot account for the detention of my 
letters. I know that I have had powerful enemies here, who 
from personal motives have in many instances endeavored 
to injure me. 

I discovered that a servant who had lived with me more 

* Ihtmf /treys to the Secretary of State, Lisbon, 6 February, 179 1. 



38 

than six years had received money to a considerable amount 
from one of these persons, the C^ Cabarras. He has paid, 
and is paying, dearly the suborning my domestics, yet more 
from his own imprudence than my efforts. 

On the 26th of Febmary, I gave an account of a friendly 
conversation which I had with the C'5 de Florida Blanca on 
that subject, which terminated to our mutual satisfaction. 

The President wall have probably communicated to you 
the letter I had the honor to write him on the first notice of 
his nomination : Least that letter should not have met with 
better fortune than so many others have done, I inclose a 
copy, as also one I wrote from Aranjuez on being advised by 
you that he had been pleased to continue me in my present 
employment. 

You will see that I have no interested motive to inlluence 
my conduct ; I can say with truth that I have now to begin 
hfe (so far as the expression may be applied to independ- 
ence and domestic ease), and I thought I could have done 
it with pleasure, until I received your letters by Colonel 
Humphreys. 

I announced to the Department of Foreign Afliiirs the 
time and the manner in which I received the cyphers sent 
me. Colonel Humphreys has seen by the covers of those 
cyphers, and by certificates I took from persons who were 
present, or who delivered them, that it would have been 
highly impmdent in me to have made use of them. If 
they have ever been employed, no letter in cypher has ever 
reached me. 

I sent duplicates of these certificates immediately to the 
department, and I find that by the fist which you send me 
of letters received that these have not come to hand. 

You will pardon this detail. It is necessary for my own 
tranquillity, which has suffered more than I can express for 
several years past, and more particularly since I have re- 
ceived your last letter. If my letters since the 26th of Feb- 
ruary have reached you, you will be convinced that no one 
here in the diplomatic line was so early or better informed 



39 

than I have been with respect to the apj)arent rupture be- 
tween this country and Great Britain. I knew how it 
would end, because I knew that measures begun in folly 
would terminate in humiliation, and humiliation might lead 
to something more. 

Something however might have been done in a moment 
of projects and apprehension, had not a certain negotiation 
carried on our part at London transpired, and which I think 
was known here rather from British policy than from the 
vigilance of the Marquis del Campo. Entirely unacquainted 
with this manoeuvre, although in correspondence with the 
person employed, I was suspected to be in the secret. 
This suspicion banished confidence, which returns by slow 
degrees. This circumstance induced me to stop entirely 
my correspondence with G. M. ; to continue it would have 
done harm, and certainly could do no good. 

I have seen extracts from the President's letter commu- 
nicated to the Duke of Leeds, perhaps mutilated or forged, 
to serve here the views of the British Cabinet : I do not yet 
dispair of obtaining copies of those letters thro' the same 
channel that I procured the first account of the demands of 
G. B., and the signature of the late convention. 

You will easily conceive that I must now discretionally 
obey (from the change of circumstances) the latter part of 
the instructions given me ; but, sir, the opportunities of 
seeing the minister in the character I hold, are so rare, that 
there is little room for information (?). However active, 
however punctual, I may be, I must wait until every ambas- 
sador, every minister, even if there was one from the Repub- 
lic of Ragusa, have had their audience, before I can obtain 
mine. You will see by the enclosed paper No. i,* the con- 
versation I have had with the minister. I have endeavored 
indirectly to suggest ideas of the necessity of a speedy 
determination in this government to adopt the measures 
pointed out by your last letters. These suggestions have 
been made to persons who have 7iow, and probably will 

♦Missincr. 



40 

have in future, much influence in the Cabinet, if the Queen 
Hves. I shall communicate to you the effects which my 
representations may produce, and with Colonel Humphrey's 
advice and approbation. If occasion offers, and circum- 
stances permit, I shall decidedly press the business. 

This government is weak ; the ministry is in a ticklish 
situation ; the Queen governs, and governs with caprice ; the 
people begin to dispute their sovereigns ; and altho' they have 
no chiefs to look up to, the dissatisfaction is general. . . . 

There is probably something in agitation here with re- 
spect to the affairs of the north. I shall endeavor to develop 
this business. Here they hold themselves in readiness to 
arm. The object is doubtful and unaccountable. It is a 
mixture of haughtiness and timidity. In fact, after having 
blundered into humiliation abroad, they want to appear 
respectable at home. This is an observation made to me 
by the C. de Campomanes, Governor of the Council of 
Castile, who is, with those he can influence, decidedly of 
opinion that it is the interest of his country to form liberal 
and lasting connections with the United States. ... * 

Wm. Carmichael. 

Gouvemeur Morris had been authorized in October, 1 789, 
to confer with the British ministers in order to learn their 
sentiments on the matters of controversy pending between 
the United States and Great Britain, and arising mainly 
from the treaty of 1 783 — that is, the detention of the western 
posts by England, the question of indemnification for negroes 
carried off contrary to treaty, a commercial treaty, and an ex- 
change of ministers between the two powers. Morris had 
reported in substance that the ministers " equivocate on 
every proposal of a treaty of commerce, and authorize in 
their communications with Mr. Morris the same conclusions 

*This letter was received by Jefferson, March 31st. 



41 

which have been drawn from those they had had from time 
to time ^vith M^ Adams, and those through Maj^ Beckwith :* 
to wit, that they do not mean to submit their present advan- 
tages in commerce to the risk which might attend a discus- 
sion of them, whereon some reciprocity could not fail to be 
demanded — unless indeed we would agree to make it a 
treaty of alliance, as well as of commerce, so as to under- 
mine our obligations with France. This mode of stripping 
that rival nation of its alliances they tried successfully with 
Holland, endeavored at with Spain, and have plainly and 
repeatedly suggested to us. For this they would probably 
relax some of the rigours they exercise against our commerce. 
That as to a minister, their Secretary for Foreign Affairs is 
disposed to exchange one, but meets with opposition in his 
cabinet, so as to render the issue uncertain."! Hence Jeff- 
erson concluded " that it would be dishonorable to the U. S., 
useless, even injurious, to renew the propositions for a treaty 
of commerce, or for the exchange of a minister : and that 
these subjects should now remain dormant, till they shall be 
brought forward earnestly by them." J The President re- 
ported to the Senate, 14 February, 1791, that from these 
conferences of Morris, he did "not infer any disposition on 
their part to enter into any arrangements merely commercial 

* Major, afterwards Sir George Beckwilh, had served in the British 
army through the Revolution, aud from 1787 to 1791, when there was 
no British minister accredited to the United States, he was entrusted 
with " an important and confidential mission," acting, in fact, as an un- 
recognized diplomatic agent. It was for his services in the West Indies 
that he was knighted. 

f Jefferson's summary of Morris's letters. 

:^ Jefferson's report to the President, 15 December, 1790. 
4 



42 

. . . unless it could be extended to a treaty of alliance, 
offensive and defensive, or unless in the event of a rupture 
with Spain." 

Here ended the episode. It may be remembered that 
in July, 1797, WiUiam Blount was expelled from the Senate 
for being concerned in a conspiracy to deliver New Orleans 
into the hands of the British, and for having instigated the 
Creeks and Cherokees to assist the British to conquer 
Louisiana. 

WORTHINGTON ChAUNCEY FoRD. 

Washington. August, i8go. 



[Secret.] 
United States, 27 August, 1790. 

Provided the dispute between Great Britain and 
Spain should come to the decision of arms, from a 
variety of circumstances (individually unimportant and 
inconclusive, but very much the reverse when com- 
pared and combined), there is no doubt in my mind that 
New Orleans and the Spanish ports above it on the 
Mississippi, will be among the first attempts of the 
former, and that the reduction of them will be under- 
taken by a combined operation from Detroit. 

The consequences of having so formidable and enter- 
prising a people as the British on both our flanks and 
rear, with their navy in front, as they respect our 
western settlements which may be seduced thereby, as 
they regard the security of the Union and its commerce 
with the West Indies, are too obvious to need enumer- 
ation. 

What then should be the answer of the Executive 
of the United States to L* Dorchester, in case he 
should apply for permission to march troops through 
the territory of the U'? States from Detroit to the 
Mississippi ? 

What notice ought to be taken of the measure, if it 
(43) 



44 

should be undertaken without leave, which is the most 
probable proceeding of the two ? * 

* August 27, 1890, Washington placed on paper these questions, 
and sent them to the Vice-President, the members of his Cabinet, and 
the Chief Justice, requesting their opinion in writing. A distinction, 
perhaps of no importance, was made in the manner of asking these 
gentlemen; for the opinion of the members of the Cabinet was " re^ 
quested to be given," but " Mr. Jay will oblige the President of the 
United States by giving his opinion." As to the form used with Mr. 
Adams, no record appears. 



REPLY OF THE VICE-PRESIDENT. 

New York, 29 August, 1 790. 

Sir: That New Orleans, and the Spanish ports on 
the Mississippi, will be among the first attempts of the 
English, in case of a war with Spain, appears very 
probable : and that a combined operation from Detroit 
would be convenient to that end cannot be doubted. 

The consequences on the western settlements, on 
the commerce with the West Indies, and on the gen- 
eral security and tranquillity of the American confed- 
eration, of having them in our rear, and on both our 
flanks, with their navy in front, are very obvious. 

The interest of the United States duly weighed, and 
their duty conscientiously considered, point out to 
them, in the case of such a war, a neutrality, as long 
as it may be practicable. The people of these States 
would not willingly support a war, and the present 
government has not strength to command, nor enough 
of the general confidence of the nation to draw the 
men or money necessary, until the grounds, causes and 
necessity of it should become generally known, and 
universally approved. A pacific character, in opposi- 
tion to a war-like temper, a spirit of conquest, or a 
disposition to military enterprise, is of great import- 
ance to us as to preserve in Europe: and therefore, we 
should not engage even in defensive war, until the 

(45) 



46 

necessity of it should become apparent, or at least 
until we have it in our power to make it manifest, in 
Europe as well as at home. 

In order to preserve an honest neutrality, or even 
the reputation of a disposition to it, the United States 
must avoid as much as possible every real wrong, and 
even every appearance of injury to either party. To 
grant to Lord Dorchester, in case he should request it, 
permission to march troops through the territory of 
the United States, from Detroit to the Mississippi, 
would not only have an appearance offensive to the 
Spaniards, of partiality to the English, but would be a 
real injury to Spain. The answer therefore to his 
lordship should be a refusal, in terms clear and decided, 
but guarded and dignified, in a manner which no 
Power has more at command than the President of the 
United States. 

If a measure so daring, offensive and hostile as the 
march of troops through our territory to attack a 
friend, should be hazarded by the English, without 
leave, or especially after a refusal, it is not so easy 
to answer the question, what notice ought to be taken 
of it. 

The Situation of our Country is not like that of the 
nations in Europe. They have generally large num- 
bers of inhabitants in narrow territories : we have 
small numbers scattered over vast regions. The 
country through which the Brittons must pass from 
Detroit to the Mississippi, is, I suppose, so thinly in- 



47 

habited, and at such a distance from all the populous 
settlements, that it would be impossible for the Presi- 
dent of the United States to collect militia or march 
troops sufficient to resist the enterprise.. After the 
step shall hav^e been taken there are two ways for us to 
proceed : one is war, and the other negotiation, Spain 
would probably remonstrate to the President of the 
United States, but whether she should or not, the 
President of the United States should remonstrate to the 
King of Great Britain. It would not be expected I 
suppose, by our friends or enemies, that the United 
States should declare war at once. Nations are not 
obliged to declare war for every injury or even hos- 
tility. A tacit acquiescence under such an outrage, 
would be misinterpreted on all hands; by Spain as in- 
imical to her, and by Britain as the effect of weakness, 
disunion and pusillanimity. Negotiation then is the 
only other alternative. 

Negotiation in the present state of things is attended 
with peculiar difficulties. As the King of Great 
Britain twice proposed to the United States an ex- 
change of ministers, once through M""- Hartley and 
once through the Duke of Dorsett, and when the 
United States agreed to the proposition, flew from it: 
to send a minister again to St. James's till that Court 
explicitly promises to send one to America, is an 
humiliation to which the United States ought never to 
submit. A remonstrance from sovereiern to sovereifjn 
cannot be sent, but by an ambassador of some order 



48 

or other : from minister of state to minister of state, it 
mi<^ht be transmitted in many other ways: a remon- 
strance in the form of a letter from the American 
Minister of State to the Duke of Leeds, or whoever 
may be Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, might be 
transmitted, through an envoy, minister plenipotentiary, 
or ambassador of the President of the United States, 
at Paris, Madrid or the Hague, and through the British 
ambassador at either of these courts. The utmost 
length that can now be gone with dignity, would be to 
send a minister to the Court of London, with instruc- 
tions to present his credentials, demand an audi- 
ence, make his remonstrance, but to make no estab- 
lishment, and demand his audience of leave and quit 
the kingdom in one, two or three months, if a minister 
of equal degree were not appointed and actually sent 
to the President of the United States from the King of 
Great Britain. 

It is a misfortune that in these critical moments and 
circumstances, the United States have not a minister 
of large views, mature age, information and judgment, 
and strict integrity, at the Courts of France, Spain, 
London and the Hague. Early and authentic intelli- 
gence from those courts may be of more importance 
than the expense; but as the representatives of the 
people, as well as the legislatures, are of a different 
opinion, they have made a very scanty provision for 
but a part of such a system. As it is, God knows 
where the men are to be found who are qualified for 



49 

such missions and would undertake them. By an ex- 
perience of ten years, which made me too unhappy at 
the time to be ever forgotten, I know that every 
artifice which can deceive, every temptation which can 
operate on hope or fear, ambition or avarice, pride or 
vanity, the love of society, pleasure or amusement, 
will be employed to divert and warp them from the 
true line of their duty and the impartial honour and 
interest of their country. 

To the superior lights and information derived from 
office; the more serene temper and profound judgment 
oi the President of the United States, these crude and 
hasty thoughts concerning the points proposed, are 
humbly submitted, with every sentiment of respect and 
sincere attachment, by his most obedient and most 
humble servant, 

John Adams. 

The President of the United States. 



OPINION OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE. 

New York, 28 August, 1 790. 

Sir: The Case which I had yesterday the Honor of 
receiving from you, gave occasion to the following 
Remarks and Reflections. 

Whether the Issue of the Negociations depending be- 
tween the British and Spanish courts is Peace or War, 
it certainly is prudent to anticipate and be prepared 
for the consequences of either event. In the present 
state of things it would doubtless militate against the 
interests of the U. S., that the Spanish territories in 
question should be reduced, and remain under the 
Government of his ]i. majesty; and probably that cir- 
cumstance would strongly unite with those others 
which must naturally lead him to regard the Posses- 
sion of these Countries as a desirable Object. 

If Permission to march Troops for that Purpose, 
thro' the territories of the U. S., should be requested, 
it will be necessary to consider 

1. Whether the Laws of Nations entitle a belli- 
gerent power to a free Passage for Troops thro' 
the Territories of a neiitral Nation? and 

2, In Case the Right to such Passage be not a 
perfect one, whether circumstances render a Re- 
fusal or a compliance most adviseable on the 
present occasion? 

(50) 



51 

The Right of Dominion involves that of the exclud- 
ing (under the Restrictions imposed by Humanity) all 
Foreigners. This Right is very rigidly exercised by 
some States, particularly the r>mpire of China. 
European Nations consider this as a general Right or 
Rule, and as subject to I'Lxceptions in favor not only 
of nations at Peace, but also of Nations at War. The 
exceptions with respect to ^ha. former do not touch the 
present question. Those which relate to the latter, 
seem to be comprized within tzvo Classes, viz- cases of 
urgent necessity, and cases of Convenience. The pres- 
ent case belongs to the latter. Vattel, who well un- 
derstood the subject, says in the 7''' chapter of his 
S*? Book.— 

That an innocent Passage is due to all Nations with 
whom a State is at Peace, and that this comprehends 
Troops equally with Individuals. That the Sovereign 
of the Country is to judge wHether this Passage be 
innocent — that his Permission must be asked — and that 
an Entry into his Territories without his Consent, is a 
violation of the Rights of Dominion — that if the neutral 
Sovereign has good Reasons for refusing a Passage, 
he is not bound to grant it; — but that if his Refusal is 
evidently unjust (the Passage requested being nnques- 
tionably innocent) a nation may do itself Justice, and 
take by Force, what it was unjustly denied — so that 
such Requests may be refused in all cases, except in 
those rare Instances, where it may be most evidently 
shown that the Passage required is absolutely without 
Danger or Inconvenience. 



52 

If the Passage in contemplation should appear to be 
of this Complection, a Refusal would generally be 
deemed improper, unless the United States should 
declare and make it an invariable maxim in their 
Policy, Jicver to permit the Troops of any Nation to pass 
thro their country. Such a measure inigJit be wise, in 
case the the U. S. were in capacity to act accordingly; 
but that not being as yet the Case, it would perhaps in 
the present moment be unreasonable. 

I say " such a measure might be wise" — whether it 
would or not, is a question that involves others, both 
legal and political, of great magnitude. Nations have 
perfect Rights. Regard to mutual Convenience may 
and often does induce Relaxations in the Exercise of 
them ; and those Relaxations, from Time and Usage, 
gradually assume to a certain Degree the Nature of 
Rights. I think it would appear on a full investigation 
of the Subject, that tlfe United States being a new 
Nation, are not bound to yield the same Relaxations, 
which in Europe from long Practice and Acquiescence 
amount almost to an implied Cession ; and therefore, 
that they may justly exercise rigorously the Right of 
denying free Passage to foreign Troops. It is also to 
be observed, that if they deny this Priviledge to others, 
it will also be denied to them ; but this leads to politi- 
cal consequences and Considerations not necessary now 
to develop or investigate. 

If a Passage should be requested and insisted upon, 
on the Ground of its being perfectly innocent, and ac- 



53 

companicd with sucli Terms and Precautions, as that a 
Refusal, altho' justifiable, would not appear to be more 
than barely so; then it will be advisable to calculate 
the Probability of their being restrained by such a 
Refusal. 

If the Probability should be, that they would never- 
theless proceed; then it would become important to 
consider whether it would not be better to grant Per- 
mission, than by a Refusal to hazard one of two en- 
cvitable Inconveniences, viz' that of opposing their 
Progress by Force of arms, and thereby risque being 
involved in the war; or of submitting to the Disgrace 
and Humiliation of permitting them to proceed with 
impunity. In my opinion it would in such a Case be 
most prudent, considering the actual state of our 
affairs, to consent to the Passage. The answer there- 
fore to be given to Lord Dorchester, in Case he should 
apply for Permission to march Troops thro' the Terri- 
tory of the U. S. from Detroit to the Mississippi, will I 
think necessarily depend on the nature of the Propo- 
sitions contained in the application, compared with the 
beforementioned Principles and Probabilities. 

As to the notice proper to be taken of the measure, 
if it should be undertaken without leave? There ap- 
pears to me to be no choice. Such a measure would 
then be so manifest a Departure from the usage of 
civilized Nations, so flagrant and wanton a violation of 
the Rights of Sovereignty, and so strong and indecent 
a Mark of Disrespect and Defiance, that their march 



54 

(if after Prohibition persisted in) should I think be 
opposed and prevented at every Risque and Hazard. 

But these Remarks in my Judgment retain but Httle 
Force when appHed to the leading of Troops from 
Posts in their actual Possession, thro' Territories un- 
der their actual Jurisdiction, altho' both the Posts and 
the Territories of right belong to the U. S. If there- 
fore they should march Troops from such posts, thro' 
such Territories, that measure would not appear to me 
to afford particular cause of complaint. On their 
arrival by such a Route at the Mississippi, they may 
in virtue of the S"" Article of the Treaty navigate it up 
to its source, or down to the ocean. 

This Subject naturally brings into view a question 
both difficult and important, viz* whether as the Pos- 
session of the Floridas would afford G. Britain ad- 
ditional Means and Facilities of annoying the U. S. the 
latter would for that Reason be justifiable in endeav- 
oring to prevent it by direct and hostile opposition ? 
The Danger of permitting any Nation so to prepon- 
derate, as to endanger the security of others, intro- 
duced into the Politics the Idea of preserving a 
Ballance of Power. How far the Principles which 
have thence been inferred, are applicable to the present 
Case, would merit serious Inquiry, if the U. S. had 
only to consider what might be right and just on the 
occasion ; but as the state of their affairs strongly re- 
commends Peace, and as there is much Reason to 
presume that it would be more prudent for them at 



55 

present to permit Britain to conquer and hold the 
Floridas, than engage in a War to prevent it, such In- 
quiries would be premature. 

With the most perfect Respect and Esteem I have 
the Honor to be, Sir, 

Your most obt. and most humble servant, 

John Jay. 
The President of the United States. 



OPINION OE THE SECRETARY OF STATE. 

Opinion on the Questions stated in the President's 
note of August 27, 1790. 

I am so deeply impressed with the magnitude of the 
dangers which will attend our government if Louisiana 
and the Floridas be added to the British Empire, that 
in my opinion we ought to make ourselves parties in 
the general war expected to take place, should this be 
the only means of preventing the calamity. 

But I think we should defer this step as long as 
possible ; because war is full of chances which may re- 
lieve us from the necessity of interfering; and if neces- 
sary, still the later we interfere the better we shall be 
prepared. 

It is often indeed more easy to prevent the capture 
of a place, than to retake it. Should it be so in the 
case in question, the difference between the two opera- 
tions of preventing and retaking, will not be so costly 
as two, three, or four years more of war. 

So that I am for preserving neutrality as long, and 
entering into the war as late, as possible. 

If this be the best course, it decides in a good de- 
gree what should be our conduct if the British ask 
leave to march troops thro' our territory, or marc?i 
them without leave. 

It is well enough agreed in the Law of Nations, that 
(56) 



57 

for a Neutral power to give or refuse permission to 
the troops of either belh'gerent party to pass through 
their territory, is no breach of neutrahty, provided the 
same refusal or permission be extended to the other 
party. 

If we give leave of passage then to the British 
troops, Spain will have no just cause of complaint 
against us, provided we extend the same leave to her 
when demanded. 

If we refuse (as indeed we have a right to do), and 
the troops should pass notwithstanding, of which 
there can be little doubt, we shall stand committed. 
For either we must enter immediately into the war, or 
pocket an acknowledged insult in the face of the 
world ; and one insult pocketed soon produces an- 
other. 

There is indeed a middle course, which I should be 
inclined to prefer, that is, to avoid giving any answer. 
They will proceed notwithstanding. But to do this 
under our silence, will admit of palliation and produce 
apologies from military necessity ; and will leave us 
free to pass it over without dishonor, or to make it a 
handle of quarrel hereafter, if we should have use for 
it as such. But if we are obliged to give an answer, 
I think the occasion not such as should induce us to 
hazard that answer which might commit us to the war 
at so early a stage of it ; and therefore that the passage 
should be permitted. 

If they should pass without having asked leave, I 
5 



58 

should be for expressing our dissatisfaction to the 
British court, and keeping ahve an altercation on the 
subject, till events should decide whether it is most 
expedient to accept their apologies, or profit of the 
aggression as a cause of war. 

Th: Jefferson. 
August 28, lygo. 



HEADS OF CONSIDERATION ON THE NAVIGATION OF 
THE MISSISSIPPI, FOR M? CARMICH \EL. 

2 Au.i^ist, X790. 
We have a right to the Navig'n of the T^Iis:-:!. 

1. by Nature. 

2. by Treaty. 
It is necessary to us 

More than half the territory of th-:^ U. S. is on the 
waters of that river. 

200,000 of their citizens are seated on them. 
These have no other outlet for their tob?, rice, com, 
hemp, lumber, house-timber, ship-tiraber, etc. 
We have hitherto borne the indecision of Spain, Because 
we wish peace. 

because our Western citizens have \v:A vent at home 
for their productions. 
A surplus of production begins now to deiuand foreign 

markets. 
Whenever they shall say 'We cannot, we will not, be 
longer shut up,' the U. S. will soon be reduced to the 
following dilemma : 

1. to force them to acquiescence. 

2. to separate from, them, rather than take part in a 
war against Spain. 

3. or to preserve them in our Union, by joining thera 
in the war. 

The I St is neither in our principles nor our power. 
2. A multitude of reasons decide against the 2d. 

One only shall be spoken out : the Nation that gives 
(59) 



6o 

up half its territory, rather than engage in a just war 
to preserve it, will not keep the other half long. 

3. the third is the only alternative we must necessarily 
adopt. 

How are we to obtain that r.avigation? 
A. By Force. 

I. Acting separately. 

that we can Effect tlii;^ with certainty and prompt- 
itude all circumstances decide. 

Obj. We cannot retain N. Or-eans, for instance, were we 
to take it. 

Ans. A moderate force may be so secured so as to hold 
out till succoured. Our succours can be prompt and 
effectual. 

Suppose after taking it, we withdraw our force. 

If Spain retakes it by an expedition, we can recover 
it by a counter-exped'n, and so, as often as the case 
shall happen. 

Their expeditions will be slow, expensive, and lead 
to catastrophe. Ours sudden, economical, and a 
check can have no consequences. 

We should associate the conntry to our union, the inhab- 
itants ^vish this. 

they are not disposed to be of the Spanish govern- 
ment. 

It is idle in Spain to suppose our Western habitants will 
submit to their gov'm't. 

they could be quiet but a short time under a gov'm't 
so repugnant to their feelings. Were they to come 
under it for present purposes, it w^ be with a view 
to throw it off soon. Should they remain they would 



6i 

communicate a spirit of independence to those with 
whom they should be mixed. 

II. Acting in conjunction with (Jr. Br. with a view 
to partition, the Floridas (includ? N. Orleans) 
would be assigned to us. 

Louisiana (or all the countn^ on the West? waters 
of y= Missi.) to them. 
We confess that such an Alliance is not what we would 
wish ; 

because it may eventually lead us into embarrassing 
situations as to our best friend, and put the power of 
two n'bors into y<= hands of one. 
L4 Lansdowne has declared he gave the Floridas to 
Spain rather than to the U. S. as a bone of discord 
with the H. of Bourbon, and of reunion with Gr. Br. 
Connolly's attempt* (as well as other facts) proves 
they keep it in view. 
B. By Negociation. 

I. What must Spain do of necessity ? 

The conduct of Spain has proved the occlusion of 
the Missi. is system with her ; if she opens it now, 
it will be because forced by imperious circum- 
stances. She will consequently shut it again 
when these circumstances cease. 
Treaty will be no obstacle. 

irregularities, real and pretended, in our navigators, 
will furnish colour enough, perpetual broils, and 
finally war will ensue. 



* On this mission of Connolly see Gayarre, History of Louisiana 
under the Spanish Domination, 235, and Brown, Political Be;^n- 
nings of Kentucky, 1S2 , — one of the publications of the Filson Club, 
and of great vahie. 



62 

prudence, and even necessity, imposes on us the law 
of settling the matter now, finally, and not by halves. 
With experience of the past, and prospect of the 
future, it w^ be imbecility in us to accept y« naked 
navigation. With that, we must have what will se- 
cure its continuance : that is, a port near the mouth, 
to receive our vessels, and protect the navigation. 
But even this will not secure the Floridas and Louisiana 
against Gr. Brit. 

if we are neutral, she will wrest those possessions 
from Spain. 

the inhabitants (French, English, Scotch, Ameri- 
cans) v/ould prefer Engl'? to Spain, 
11. What then had Spain better do of choice ? 

Cede to us all territory on our side the Missis- 
sippi. 

on condition that we guarantee all her poss'n 
on the western waters of that river, she agreeing 
further to subsidize us, if the guarantee brings us 
into the war. 
Should Gr. Br. possess herself of the Floridas and Louisi- 
ana, her governing principles are Conquest, Coloni- 
zation, Commerce, Monopoly. 
She will establish powerful colonies in them, 
these can be poured into the gulph of Mexico, for 
any sudden enterprise there. 

or invade Mexico their next neighbor by land; 
whilst a fleet co-operates along shore, and cuts off 
relief. 

and proceed successively from colony to colony. 
With respect to us, if Gr. Br. establishes herself on our 
whole land board, our lot will be 



^>3 

bloody and eternal war 

or indissoluble confederacy. 

Which ought we to choose ? 

V\'hat will be the lot of the Span, colonies in the jaws 

of such a confederacy? 

What will secure the Ocean against Monopoly? 
Safer for Spain that we should be her neighbor, than 

England. 

Conquest not in our principles : inconsistent with 

our govm't. 

Not our interest to cross the Mississippi for ages, 

And will never be our interest to remain ■•-•'--' -vith 

those who do. 

Intermediate chances save the trouble of calculating 

so far fonvard. 
Consequences of this cession, and giaarantee. 

1 . Every subject of difference will be removed from 
between Spain and the U. S. 

2. Our interest wl' be strongly engaged in her retain- 
ing her American possessions. 

3. Spain will be quieted as to Louisiana and her ter- 
ritories west of that. 

4. She may employ her whole force in defence of 
her islands and Southern possessions. 

5. If we preserve our neutrality, it will be a very 
partial one to her. 

6. If we are forced into the war, it will be, as we 
wish, on the side of the H. of Bourbon. 

7. Our privateers will commit formidable depred'n 
on y« Erit. trade, and occupy much of their force, 

8. By withold'g supplies of provision, as well as by 



64 

concurring in exped'ns, y? Brit isl^^ will be in im- 
minent danger. 
9. Their expences of precaution, both for their con- 
tinental and insular poss'ns will be so augmented, 
as to give a hope of running their credit down. 

In fine, for a narrow strip of barren, detached, 
and expensive country, Spain secures the rest of 
her territory, and makes an ally where she might 
have a dangerous enemy.* 

* These heads are in Jefferson's MS., but differ somewhat from those 
printed in his IVorks, ix, 4 1 2. 



HEADS OF CONSIDERATION ON THE CONDUCT WE ARE 
TO OBSERVE IN THE WAR BETWEEN SPAIN AND GR. 
BRITAIN, AND PARTICULARLY SHOULD THE LATfER 
ATPERHn^ THE CONQUEST OF LOUISIANA AND THE 
FLO RI DAS. 

[i2 July, 1790.] 
The danger to us sh"? G. B. possess herself of Louisiana 
and the Floridas. 
Beyond the Missi. a territory equal to half ours. 
She would seduce our Cis-Missi. possessions. 

Because N. Orleans \vill draw to it the dependence 
of all those waters. 

By her language, laws, religion, manners, goven^, 
commerce, capitals. 

By the markets she can offer them in the gulph of 
Mexico. 
She would then have a territory the double of ours. 
She would take away the markets of the Atlantic 
States, 

By furnishing the same articles cheaper, tob?, rice, 
indigo, bread, lumber, fur. 
She would encircle us completely, her possessions 
forming a line on our land boards, her fleets on our 
sea board. Instead of two neighbors balancing each 
other, we should have one with y^ strength of both. 
Would the prevention of this be worth a War ? 
Consider our abilities to make a war. 
Our operations would be by land only. 
How many men would it need to employ? — their 
cost? 

(65) 



66 

Our resources by taxation and credit equal to this. 

Weigh the evil of this new accumulation of debt. 

Against the loss of market and eternal danger and 

expence of such a neighbor. 
But no need to take a part as yet. We may choose our 

own time for that. 
Delay gives us many chances to avoid it altogether. 

They may not single out that object. 

They may fail in it. 

France and Spain may recover it. 
The difference between preventing and retaking, 

overbaH by benefits of delay. 

Enables us to be better prepared. 

To stipulate with Spain and France advantages for 

our assistance. 
Suppose these our ultimate views, what is to be done at 

this time? 

1. As to Spain. 

If she be as sensible as we are, that she cannot save 
Louisiana and the Floridas, might she not prefer 
their Independ^f to their Subject"? to Gr. Br. ? 
Can we not take advantage of C. D'Estaing's pro- 
pos'n to communicate thro' the court of France our 
ideas on this subject and our readiness to join them 
in guarantee? 

This might save us from a war, if Gr. Br. respects 
our weight in a war. If she does not, it would place 
the war on popular ground. 

2. As to England, say to B.[eckwith] : — 

That as to a treaty of commerce we h^ never de- 
sired it but on terms of perfect reciprocity. 



67 

That therefore we never thought to give any price for 
it but itself. 

That we had wished for it to avoid giving mutual 
bounds to the commerce of both nations. 
But that we have the measures in our own power 
which may save us from loss. 

That as to the alliance they propose, it would in- 
volve us against France and Spain. 
And considered even in a moral view, no price could 
repay such an abandonm^. of character. 
That we are truly disposed to remain strictly neutral. 
Tho' we must confess y'. we sh4 view in a very ser- 
ious hght attempts to extend themselves along our 
frontier, and destroy all balance in our neighborhood. 
[The latter sentiment it might be advantageous to express, 
because if there be any difference of op'n in her 
councils whether to bend their force ag'. North or 
South America (and certainly there is room for dif- 
ference) and if these operations be nearly balanced, 
the possibility of drawing an enemy the more on 
themselves, might determine the balance.]* 



* A single sheet in Jefferson's MS., undated and without signature. 
It is the first draft of a paper drawn up by Jefferson as the basis of a 
reply to the mission of George Eeckwith, some particulars of which are 
given in a note to the opinion of Hamilton, in the pages following. The 
paper as completed is printed, with errors, in the Works of Jefferson, 
ix, 409, and differs in many details from this draft. 



HAMILTON TO WASPIIXGTOX. 

New- York, Sept. 15, 1790. 

The urgent avocations in which I have been en- 
gaged, towards putting in a train of execution the laws 
of the last session affecting my department, and a de- 
sire of reflecting maturely, and giving the reasons for 
the result of my reflections fully, have caused me to 
delay longer than I wished the answer to the questions 
with which you honored me, and I hope will excuse 
the delay. 

The judgments formed, in particular cases, are al- 
most always connected with a general train of ideas in 
respect to some more comprehensive principles or re- 
lations ; and I had thought it advisable to lay that train 
before you, for the better explanation of the grounds 
of the opinions I now give, or may hereafter have oc- 
casion to give, on the like subjects, in obedience to 
your commands. 

I feel no small regret in troubling you with the 
perusal of so voluminous a discussion ; but as I thought 
it would be satisfactory to you to have the reasons of 
the opinions you required fully submitted to your 
consideration, I conceived it to be more consistent 
with my duty to risk some intrusion on your time, 
than to withhold any consideration that appeared to 
me of weight enough to enter into the determination. 

Tht President of the United States. 
(68) 



OPINION OF THE SECRETARY OF THE TRF:ASURY. 

New- York, Sept. 15, 1790. 

Anszver to Questions proposed by the President of the 
U?iited States to the Secretary of the Treasury. 

Question the First. — "What should be the answer 
of the Executive of the United States to Lord Dor- 
chester, in case he should apply for permission to 
march troops through the territory of said States, from 
Detroit to the Mississippi ?" 

Answer. — In order to a right judgment of what 
ought to be done in such case, it may be of use pre- 
viously to consider the following points : 

First. — Whether there be a right to refuse or con- 
sent, as shall be thought most for the interest of the 
United States. 

Secondly. — The consequences to be expected from 
refusal or consent. 

Thirdly. — The motives to the one or to the other. 

As to the first point, if it were to be determined 
upon principle only, without regard to precedents or 
opinions, there would seem to be no room for hesita- 
tion about the right to refuse. The exclusive juris- 
diction which every independent nation has over its 
own territory, appears to involve in it the right of pro- 
hibiting to all others the use of that territory in any 
way disagreeable to itself, and more especially for any 

(69) 



purpose of war, which always implies a degree of 
danger and inconvenience, with the exception only of 
cases of necessity. 

And if the United States were in a condition to do 
it without material hazard, there would be strong in- 
ducements to their adopting it as a general rule never 
to grant a passage for a voluntary expedition of one 
power against another, unless obliged to it by treaty. 

But the present situation of the United States is too 
little favorable to encountering hazards, to authorize 
attempts to establish rules, however eligible in them- 
selves, which are repugnant to the received maxims 
or usages of nations. 

It is therefore necessary to inquire v/hat those max- 
ims or usages enjoin in the case suggested. 

With regard to usage, it has been far from uniform. 
There are various instances in ancient and modern 
times of similar permissions being demanded — many, 
in which they have been granted; others in which 
they have been refused, and the refusal acquiesced in ; 
but perhaps more in which, when refused, a passage 
has been forced, and the doing of it has often been 
deemed justifiable. 

Opinions are not more harmonious. Among those 
who maybe considered as authorities on such subjects, 
Puffendorf and Barbeyrac confine within narrow limits 
tlie right of passage through neutral territories; while 
Grotius and Vattel, particularly the former, allow to it 
greater latitude. Puffendorf treats it not as a natural 



71 

right, but as derived from compact or concession ; 
especially when the enemy of a neighboring state de- 
sires leave to march troops through a neutral country 
against its neighbor. For it seems (says he) to be a 
part of tlie duty which wc ozve to our ncigJUwrs^ espe- 
cially such as have been kind and friendly, not to suffer 
any hostile power to march through our country to 
their \)x€]\x^\z<i, provided ivc can hiudcr the design zuitk 
no great inconvenience to o/nse/ves. And as it may 
have a tendency to make our own country the theatre 
of the war (since the power intended to be attacked 
ma}^ justifiably march v/ithin our linn'ts to nu.ct the 
approaching enemy), he concludes that it is the safest 
way of acting in such case, if we can do it without any 
considerable prejudice to our own affairs, to dcn\' tlie 
enemy passage, and actually to oppose him if he en- 
deavors to force it without our consent. But if we 
are either too weak to hinder his progress, or must on 
this score engage in a dangerous war, he admits that 
the plea of necessity will fairly justify us to our 
neighbor. 

Examples, he adds, have little force on the decision 
of the question. For, generally, as people have been 
stronger or weaker, they have required passage with 
modesty or with confidence, and have in like manner 
granted or refused it to others.* 

Barbeyrac, in his Commentary on Grotius, is still 

* Puffendorf's Laws of Nature and Nations, pages 239, 240. 



72 

stronger against the right of passage.* He affirms 
that, even though we have nothing to apprehend from 
those who desire a passage, we are not therefore 
obhged in rigor to grant it. It necessarily follows, 
says he, from the right of property, that the proprietor 
may refuse another the use of his goods. Humanity, 
indeed, requires that he should grant that use to those 
who stand in need of it, when it can be done without 
any considerable inconvenience to himself; but if he 
even then refuses it, though he transgresses his duty, 
he does no wrong, properly so called, except they are 
in extreme necessity, which is superior to all ordinary 
rules. Thus far, and no further, extends the reserve 
with which it is supposed the establishment of prop- 
erty is accompanied. 

Grotius, on the other hand, expresses himself thus : f 
A free passage ought to be granted to persons where 
J2ist occasion shall require, over any lands, or rivers, 
or such parts of the sea as belong to any nation ; and, 
after enumerating several examples in support of his 
position, he concludes that the middle opinion is best; 
to wit, that the liberty of passing ought first to be de- 
manded, and if denied, may be claimed by force. 
Neither, says he, can it be reasonably objected that 
there may be suspicion of danger from the passing of 
a multitude ; for one man's right is not diminished by 

* Note I on Book II., Chap. III., § xiii. 

f Rights of War and Peace, Book II., Chap. II., § xiii., Nos. i, 2, 3, 4. 



73 

another man's fear. Nor is the fear of provoking that 
prince against whom he tiiat desires to pass is engaged 
in d.just war, a sufficient reason for refusing him pass- 
age. Nor is it any more an excuse that he may pass 
another way, for this is what every body may equally 
allege, and so this right by passing would be entirely 
destroyed. But it is enough that the passage be re- 
quested, without any fraud or ill design, by the nearest 
and most convenient way. If, indeed, he who desires 
to pass undertakes an imjitst war, or if he brings peo- 
ple who are my enemies along with him, I viay deny 
him a passage ; for in this case I have a right to meet 
and oppose him, even in his own land, and to inter- 
cept his march. Thus it would seem to be the opin- 
ion of Grotius, that a party engaged in a Just war has 
a right, of course, to a passage through a neutral ter- 
ritory, which can scarcely, if at all, be denied him, 
even on the score of danger or inconvenience to the 
party required to grant it. 

But Vattel, perhaps the most accurate and approved 
of the writers on the laws of nations, preserves a mean 
between these* different opinions. This is the sum 
of what he ad\'ances : That an ijinccent passage is 
due to all nations with whom a state is at peace, for 
troops equally with individuals, and to annoy as well 
as to avoid an enemy. That the party asking and the 
party asked are both, in different degrees, judges of 

♦Book III., Chap. VII., s^ 119, 120, 121, 122, 123. 
6 



74 

the question zvJicn innocent? That where the party 
asked has good reasons for refusing, he is not under 
an}^ obh'gation to G^rant, and in do}ibff7il ctvscs his judg- 
ment ougJit to be definitive ; but in evident ones, or 
those in which the harmlessness of the passage is 
manifest, the party asking may, in the hist resort, judge 
for himself, and after demand and refusal may force 
his way. That nevertheless, as it is very difficult for 
the passage of a powerful army to be absolutely inno- 
cent, and still more difficult for its innocence to be 
apparent, a refusal ought to be submitted to, except in 
those very rare cases when it can be shown in the most 
palpable manner that the passage required is abso- 
lutely without danger or inconvenience. And lastly, 
that this right of passage is only due in a war not 
materially unjust. 

Perhaps the only inference to be drawn from all this 
is, that there exists in the practice of nations and the 
dogmas of political writers a certain vague pretension 
to a right of passage in particular cases, and accord- 
ing to circumstances, which is sufficient to afford to 
the strong a pretext for claiming and exercising it 
when it suits their interests, and to render it always 
dangerous to the weak to refuse, and sometimes not 
less so to grant it. 

It is, nevertheless, a proper inquiry, whether a re- 
fusal could be placed on such ground as would give a 
reasonable cause of umbrage to the party refused, and 
as in the eye of the world would justify it. 



75 

Against the propriety of a refusal arc the following 
circumstances : That there is no connection between 
us and Spain, which obliges us to it. That the pas- 
sage asked will be down rivers, and for the most part 
through an uninhabited wilderness, whence no injury 
to our citizens or settlements will be apprehended: 
and that the number of troops to be marched, espe- 
cially considering the route, will probabl}- not be such, 
as on their own account, to be a serious cause of alarm. 
These circumstances may give our refusal the com- 
plexion of partiality to Spain, and of indisposition 
towards Britain, which may be represented as a devia- 
tion from the spirit of exact neutrality. 

In support of the propriety of a refusal, the follow- 
ing is the only assignable reason ; that it is safer for 
us to have two powerful, but rival nations, bordering 
upon our two extremities, than to have one powerful 
nation pressing us on both sides, and in capacity, here- 
after, by posts and settlements, to envelop our whole 
interior frontier. 

The good offices of Spain in the late war ; the dan- 
ger of the seduction of our western inhabitants ; the 
probable consequences to the trade of the Atlantic 
States, are considerations rather to be contemplated as 
motives, than alleged as reasons. 

The first reason, however, is of a nature to satisfy 
the mind of the justice of a refusal; admitting the 
authority of the more moderate opinions, which have 
been cited. And the danger, too, upon the supposi- 



76 

rion of which it is founded, appears to be obvious 
enough to vindicate it, in the opinion of the disinter- 
ested part of mankind ; little likely as it may be to 
engage the acquiescence of the party whose wishes 
would be thwarted by the refusal. It deserves, not- 
withstanding, to be noticed on this point, that the 
groinid of dissent would not result from the thing 
itself — that is, the vicrc passage — but from the nature 
of the acquisition, to which it would give facility. 
This circumstance may somewhat obscure the clear- 
ness of the conclusion, that there is a perfect right to 
refuse. 

Bul upon the whole, there does not appear to be 
room enough for a scruple about the right, to deter 
from refusal, if upon examination it shall be found 
expedient. 

Does the right of consenting to the passage stand 
upon ground equally unexceptionable? 

This question Vattel answers in the following man- 
ner : * " When I have no reason to refuse the passage, 
the party against whom it is granted has no room for 
complaint, much less for making it a pretence for war; 
since I did no more than what the law of nations en- 
joins. Neither has he any right to require that I 
should deny the passage, because he is not to hinder 
me from doing what I think is agreeable to my duty, 
and even on occasion zc'hen I might ivitJi Justice deny 



* Vattel, Book III., Chap, vii.. Section 127. 



the passa^i^c, it in alio^caoic in me not to make use <.el wxy 
right ; especially iclie)! I shouhl be obliged to support 
my refusal bv my szvord. Who will take iijxmi him to 
complain of my ha\-ini^ permitted the war to be car- 
ried into his own country, rather than draw it on my- 
self? It cannot' be expected tiiat I should take up 
arms in his favor, unless obli^^ed to it by a treaty." 
And Puffendorf admits, as has been before noted, that 
if we are either too zveak to hinder his progress, or 
must on that score engage in a dangerous war, the 
plea of necessity will fairly justify us to our neighbor. 

Nothing need be added to reasoning so perspicuous 
and convincing. It does not admit of a moment's 
doubt, as a general rule, that a neutral state, unfettered 
by any stipulation, is not bound to expose itself to a 
war, merely to shelter a neighbor from the approaclies 
of its enemy. It remains to examine, if there are an}' 
circumstances, in our particular case, capable of form- 
ing an exception to that rule. 

It is not to be forgotten that we received from 
France, in our late rev^olution, essential succor, and 
from Spain valuable countenance, and some direct aid. 
It is also to be remembered, that France is the inti- 
mate ally of Spain, and there subsists a connection b)- 
treaty between the former power and the United 
States. 

It might thence be alleged that obligations of grati- 
tude towards these powers require that we should run 
some risk, rather than concur in a thing prejudical to 



78 

either of them, and particularly in favor of that very 
nation against which they assisted us. And the nat- 
ural impulse of ever)- good heart will second the 
jDroposition, till reason has taught it that refinements 
of this kind are to be indulged with caution in the 
affairs of nations. 

Gratitude is a word, the very sound of which im- 
poses something like respect. Where there is even an 
appearance upon whicli the claim to it can be founded, 
it can seldom be a pleasing task to dispute that claim. 
But where a word may become the basis of a political 
system, affecting the essential interests of the state, it 
is incumbent upon those who have any concern in the 
public administration, to appreciate its true import and 
application. 

It is necessary, then, to reflect, however painful the 
reflection, that gratitude is a duty, a sentiment, which 
between nations can rarely have any solid foundation. 
Gratitude is only due to a kindness or service, the 
predominant object of which is the interest or benefit 
of the party to whom it is performed. Where the 
interest or benefit of the party performing is the pre- 
dominant cause of it, however there may result a debt, 
in cases in which there is not an immediate adequate 
and reciprocal advantage, there can be no room for the 
sentiment of gratitude. Where there is such an ad- 
vantage, there is then not even a debt. If the motive 
to the act, instead of being the benefit of the party to 
whom it is done, should be a compound of the inter- 



est of the party doing it and of detriment to some 
other, of whom he is the enemy and the rival, there is 
still less room for so noble and refined a sentiment. 
This analysis will serve as a test of our true situation, 
in regard both to France and Spain. 

It is not to be doubted, that the part which the 
courts of France and Spain took in our quarrel with 
Great Britain, is to be attributed, not to an attachment 
to our independence or liberty, but to a desire of di- 
minishing the power of Great Britain by severing the 
British Empire. This they considered as an interest 
of very great magnitude to them. In this their calcu- 
lations and their passions conspired. For this, they 
united their arms with ours, and encountered the ex- 
penses and perils of war. This has been accom- 
plished ; the advantages of it are mutual ; and so far 
the account is balanced. 

In the progress of the war* they lent us money, as 
necessary to its success, and during our inability to 
pay they have forborne to press us for it. The money 
we ought to exert ourselves to repay with interest, 
and as well for the loan of it, as for the forbearance to 
urge the repayment of the sums which have become 
due, we ought always to be ready to make propor- 
tionate acknowledgments, and when opportunities 
shall offer, returns answerable to the nature of the 
service. 

* France has made us one loan since tlie peace. 



So 

Let it be added to this, that the conduct of France 
in the manner of affording her aid, bore the marks of 
a liberal policy. She did not endeavor to extort from 
us, as the price of it, any disadvantageous or humili- 
ating concessions. In this respect, however, she may 
have been influenced by an enlightened view of her 
own interest. She entitled herself to our esteem and 
good will. These dispositions towards her ought to 
be cherished and cultivated ; but they are very distinct 
from a spirit of romantic gratitude, calling for sacri- 
fices of our substantial interests, preferences incon- 
sistent with sound polic}', or complaisances incompat- 
ible with our safety. 

The conduct of Spain towards us presents a picture 
far less favorable. The direct aid we received from 
her during the war was inconsiderable in itself, and 
still more inconsiderable compared with her faculty of 
aiding us. She refrained from acknowledging our 
independence ; has never acceded to the treaty of 
conmierce made with France, though a right of doing 
it was reserved to her, nor made any other treaty with 
us; she has maintained possessions within our ac- 
knowledged limits without our consent ; she persever- 
ingly obstructs our sharing in the navigation of the 
Mississippi, though it is a privilege essential to us, and 
to which we consider ourselves as having an indisput- 
able title. And perhaps it might be added upon good 
ground, that she has not scrupled to intrigue with 
leading individuals in the western country, to seduce 



8i 

them from our interests, and to attach them to lier 
own. 

Spain therefore must be regarded, upon the wliole, 
as having slender claims to peculiar good will from us. 
There is certainly nothing that authorizes her to ex- 
pect we should expose ourselves to any extraordinary 
jeopardy for her sake. And to conceive that any con- 
siderations relative to France ought to be extended to 
her, would be to set up a doctrine altogether new in 
politics. The ally of our ally has no claim, as such, 
to our friendship. We may have substantial groimds 
of dissatisfaction against him, and act in consequence 
of them, even to open hostility, without derogating in 
any degree from what we owe to our ally.' 

This is so true, that if a war should really ensue be- 
tween Great Britain and Spain, and if the latter sliould 
persist in excluding us from the Mississippi (taking it 
for granted our claim to share in its navigation is well 
founded), there can be no reasonable ground of doubt 
that we should be at liberty, if we thought it our in- 
terest, consistently with our present engagements with 
France, to join Britain against Spain. 

How far it might be expedient to place ourselves in 
a situation which, in case France should eventually 
become a party in the war, might entangle us in oppo- 
site duties on the score of the stipulated guarantee of 
her West India possessions, or might have a tendency 
to embroil us with her, would be a mere question of 
prudential and liberal calculation, which would have 



82 

nothing to do with the right of taking side against 
Spain. 

These are truths necessary to be contemplated with 
freedom, because it is impossible to foresee what events 
may spring up, or whither our interests may point ; 
and it is very important to distinguish with accuracy 
how far we are bound, and where we are free. 

However vague the obligations of gratitude may be 
between nations, those of good faith are precise and 
determinate. Within their true limits, they can hardly 
be held too sacred. But by exaggerating them, or 
giving them a fanciful extension, they would be in 
danger of losing their just force. This would be con- 
verting them into fetters, which a nation would ere long 
be impatient to break, as consistent neither with its 
prosperity nor its safety. Hence, while it is desirable 
to maintain with fidelity our engagements to France, 
it is advisable, on all occasions, to be aware that they 
oblige us to nothing towards Spain. 

From this view of the subject, there does not appear 
any circumstance in our case capable of forming an 
exception to the general rule ; and, as it is certain that 
there can hardly be a situation less adapted to war 
than that in which we now find ourselves, we can, with 
the greatest sincerity, offer the most satisfactory ex- 
cuse to Spain for not withholding our consent, if our 
own interests do not decide us to a contrary course. 

The conclusion from what has been said is, that 
there is a right either to refuse or consent, as shall be 



S3 

judged for the interest of the United States; though 
the right to consent is less questionable than the right 
to refuse. 

The consequences to be expected from refusal or 
consent present themselves next to consideration. 
Those of consent shall be first examined. 

An increase of the means of annoying us in the 
same hands is a certain ill consequence of the acquisi- 
tion of the Floridas and Louisiana by the British. 
This will result not only from contiguity to a greater 
part of our territory, but from the increased facility of 
acquiring an undivided influence over all the Indian 
tribes inhabiting within the borders of the United 
States. 

Additional danger of the dismemberment of the 
western country is another ill consequence to be ap- 
prehended from that acquisition. This will arise as 
well from the greater power of annoying us, as from 
the greater power which it is likely would be pursued 
by that nation, if in possession of the key to the only 
outlet for the productions of that country. Instead of 
shutting, they would probably open the door to its in- 
habitants, and by conciliating their good will on the 
one hand, and making them sensible on the other of 
their dependence on them for the continuance of so 
essential an advantage, they might hold out to them 
the most powerful temptation to a desertion of their 
connection with the rest of the United States. The 
avarice and ambition of individuals may be made to 
co-operate in favor of those views. 



84 

A third ill consequence of that acquisition would 
be, material injury, in time to come, to the commerce 
of the Atlantic States. By rendering New Orleans 
the emporium of the products of the western country, 
Britain would, at a period not very distant, have little 
occasion for supplies of provisions for their islands 
from the Atlantic States; and for their European mar- 
ket they would derive from the same source copious 
supplies of tobacco and other articles now furnished 
by the Southern States : whence a great diminution 
of the motives to establish liberal terms of commercial 
intercourse with the United States collectively. 

These consequences are all expressed or implied in 
the form of the question stated by the President. And 
as far as our consent can be supposed likely to have 
influence upon the event, they constitute powerful 
objections to giving it. 

If even it should be taken for granted that our con- 
sent or refusal would have no influence either way, it 
would not even then cease to be disagreeable to con- 
cur in a thing apparently so inauspicious to our inter- 
ests. And it deserves attention, that our concurrency 
might expose us to the imputation either of want of 
foresight to discover a danger, or of vigor to with- 
stand it. 

But there is almost always in such cases a compari- 
son of evils; and the point of prudence is, to make 
choice of that course which threatens the fewest or the 
least, or sometimes the least certain. The conse- 



85 

quences of refusal are therefore to be weighed against 
those of consent. 

It seems to be a matter taken for granted by the 
writers upon the subject, that a refusal ought to be 
accompanied with a resolution to support it, if neces- 
sar}-, h}^ the sword ; or in other words, to oppose the 
passage, if attempted to be forced, or to resent the in- 
jur\-, if circumstances should not permit an effectual 
opposition. This, indeed, is implied in the nature of 
the thing; for to what purpose refuse, unless it be in- 
tended to niake good the refusal? or how avoid dis- 
grace, if our territories arc suffered to be violated with 
impunity, after a formal and deliberate prohibition of 
passage ? 

There are cases in which a nation may, without 
ignominy, wink at an infraction of its rights; but this 
does not appear to be one of them. After having been 
asked its permission and having refused it, the pre- 
sumption will be that it has estimated the consequences, 
calculated its means, and is prepared to assert and up- 
hold its rights. If the contrary of this should turn 
out to be its condilct, it must bring itself into contempt 
for inviting insult which it is unable to repel, and man- 
ifesting ill-will towards a power which it durst not re- 
sist. As, on the one hand, there cannot be conceived 
to be a greater outrage than to pass through our 
country, in defiance of our declared disapprobation; 
so, on the other, there cannot be a greater humiliation 
than to submit to it. 



86 

The consequence therefore of refusal, if not effectual, 
must be absolute disgrace or immediate war. This 
appears, at least, to be the alternative. 

Whether a refusal would have the desired effect, is 
at best problematical. The presumption, perhaps, is, 
that Great Britain will have adverted to the possibilit}^ 
of it; and if, under the uncertainty of what would be 
our conduct, she should still have resolved on prose- 
cuting the enterprise through our territory, that she 
will at the same time have resolved, either to ask no 
questions, or to disregard our dissent. It is not un- 
likely that the reasoning of the British cabinet will 
have been to this effect : — If the United States have no 
predilection for Spain, or if their views of their own 
interest are not opposed to the acquisition we medi- 
tate, they will not withhold their consent ; if either the 
one or the other be the case, it ought to be determined 
beforehand, whether their enmity be a greater evil, 
than the projected acquisition a good; and if we do 
not choose to renounce the one, we must be prepared 
to meet the other. 

A further ill consequence of the refusal, if ineffectual, 
not wholly destitute of weight, is this, that Great Brit- 
ain would then think herself under less obligation to 
keep measures with us, and would feel herself more 
at liberty to employ every engine in her power to 
make her acquisition as prejudicial to us as possible ; 
whereas, if no impediment should be thrown in the 
way by us, more good humor may beget greater 



moderation, and, in the progress of thinj^^s, concessions 
securing us may be made, as the price of our future 
neutrality. An exph'cit recognition of our right to 
navigate the Mississippi to and from the ocean, with 
the possession of New Orleans, would greatly mitigate 
the causes of apprehension from the conquest of the 
Floridas by the British. 

The consequences of refusal or consent constitute 
leading motives to the one or to the other ; ^\ hich 
now claim a more particular discussion. 

It has been seen that the ill effects to be appre- 
hended from the conquest of the Spanish territories in 
our neighborhood are, an increase of the means 
whereby we may be hereafter annoyed, and of the 
danger of the separation of the western country from 
the rest of the Union ; and a future interference w ith 
the trade of the Atlantic States, in a manner, too, not 
conducive to the general weal. 

As far as there is a prospect that a refusal would be 
an impediment to the enterprise, the considerations 
which have been mentioned afford the strongest in- 
ducements to it. But if that effect of it be doubtful, 
the force of these inducements is proportionably dimin- 
ished ; if improbable, it nearly ceases. The prospect 
in this case would be, that a refusal would aggra\'ate 
instead of preventing the evil it was intended to obvi- 
ate. And it mu.st be acknowledged that the success 
of it is, at least, very doubtful. 

The consideration that our assent may be construed 



88 

into want of foresight or want of vigor, though not to 
be disregarded, would not be sufficient to justify our 
risking a war in our present situation. The cogent 
reasons we have to avoid a war are too obvious and 
intelhgible, not to furnish an explanation of and an 
apology for our conduct in this respect. 

Whatever may be the calculations with regard to 
the probable effect of a refusal, it ought to be pre- 
dicated upon the supposition that it may not be re- 
garded, and accompanied with a determination to act 
as a proper attention to national dignity would in such 
an event dictate. This would be to make war. 

For it is a sound niaxivi, that a state had better haz- 
ard any calamities than submit tamely to absolute 
disgrace. 

Now it is manifest, that a government scarcely ever 
had stronger motives to avoid war, than that of the 
United States at the present juncture. They have 
much to dread from war; much to expect from peace; 
scmething to hope from negotiation, in case of a rup- 
ture between Britain and Spain. 

We are but just recovering from the effects of a long, 
arduous, and exhausting war. The people but just 
begin to realize the sweets of repose. We are vul- 
nerable both by water and land ; without either fleet 
or army. We have a considerable debt in proportion 
to the resources which the state of things permits the 
government to command. Measures have been re- 
cently entered upon for the restoration of credit, 



89 

which a war could hardly fail to disconcert, and 
which, if disturbed, would be fatal to the means of 
prosecuting it. Our national government is in its in- 
fancy. The habits and dispositions of our people are 
ill suited to those liberal contributions to the treasury, 
which a war would necessarily exact. There are 
causes which render war in this country more expen- 
sive, and consequently more difficult to be carried on, 
than in any other. There is a general disinclination 
to it in all classes. The theories of the speculative, 
and the feelings of all, are opposed to it. The support 
of public opinion (perhaps more essential to our gov- 
ernment than to any other) could only be looked for 
in a war evidently resulting from necessity. 
• These are general reasons against going into war. 
There are others, of a more particular kind. To the 
people at large the quarrel would be apt to h.ave the 
appearance of having originated in a desire of shield- 
ing Spain from the arms of Britain. There are several 
classes of men to whom this idea would not be agree- 
able, especially if the Dutch were understood to be in 
conjunction with the British. All those who were not 
friendly to our late Revolution would certainly dislike 
it. Most of the descendants of the Dutch would be 
unfriendly to it. And let it not be overlooked, that 
there is still a considerable proportion of those who 
were firm friends to the Revolution, who retain pre- 
possessions in favor of Englishmen, and prejudices 
against Spaniards. 
7 



90 

In a popular government especially, however pre- 
judices like these may be regretted, they are not to be 
excluded from political calculations. 

It ought also to be taken into the account, that by 
placing ourselves at this time in a situation to go to 
war against Great Britain, we embark with the weak- 
est party — with a total uncertainty what accession of 
strength may be gained — and without making any 
terms with regard either to succor, indemnity, or 
compensation. 

France is the only weight which can be thrown into 
the scale, capable of producing an equilibrium. But 
her accession, however probable, ought not to be 
deemed absolutely certain. The predominant party 
there may choose to avoid war as dangerous to their 
own power. And if even obstacles should not arise 
from that quarter, it cannot be foreseen to what ex- 
tent France will be in condition to make efforts. The 
great body of malcontents comprehending a large pro- 
portion of the most wealthy and formerly the most in- 
fluential class — the prodigious innovations which have 
been made — the general and excessive fermentation 
which has been excited in the minds of the people — 
the character of the prince, or the nature of the gov- 
ernment likely to be instituted, as far as can be judged 
prior to an experiment — do not prognosticate much 
order or vigor in the affairs of that country for a con- 
siderable period to come. 

It is possible, indeed, that the enthusiasm which the 



91 

transition from slavery to liberty may inspire, may be 
a substitute for the energy of a good administration, 
and the spring of great exertions. But the ebullitions 
of enthusiasm must ever be a precarious reliance. 
And it is quite as possible that the greatness, and per- 
haps immaturity, of that transition, may prolong licen- 
tiousness and disorder. Calculations of what may 
happen in France must be unusually fallible, not 
merely from the yet unsettled state of things in that 
kingdom, but from the extreme violence of the change 
which has been wrought in the situation of the 
people. 

These considerations are additional admonitions to 
avoid, as far as possible, any step that may embroil us 
with Great Britain. It seems evidently our true policy 
to cultivate neutrality. This, at lea.st, is the ground 
on which we ought to stand, until we can see more of 
the scene, and can have secured the means of chang- 
ing it with advantage. 

We have objects which, in such a conjuncture, are 
not to be neglected. The Western posts, on one side, 
and the navigation of tlic Mississippi, on the other, call 
for a vigilant attention to what is going on. They arc 
both of importance. The securing of the latter may 
be regarded in its consequence as essential to the unity 
of the empire. 

But it is not impossible, if war tak'es place, that by a 
judicious attention to favorable moments, we may ac- 
complish both by negotiation. The moment, how- 



92 

ever, we became committed on either side, the advan- 
tages of our position for negotiation would be gone. 
They would even be gone in respect to the party with 
whom we were in co-operation ; for being once in the 
war, we could not make terms as the condition of 
entering it. 

Though it may be uncertain how long we shall be 
permitted to preserve our neutrality, that is not a suffi- 
cient reason for departing from it voluntarily. It is 
possible we may be permitted to persist in it through- 
out. And if we must renounce it, it is better it should 
be from necessity than choice ; at least till we see a 
prospect of renouncing with safety and profit. If the 
government is forced into a war, the cheerful support of 
the people may be counted upon. If it brings it upon 
itself, it will have to struggle with their displeasure 
and reluctance. The difference alone is immense. 

The desire of manifesting amity to Spain, from the 
supposition that our permanent interest is concerned 
in cementing an intimate connection with France and 
Spain, ought to have no influence in the case. Ad- 
mitting the existence of such an interest, it ought not 
to hurry us into premature hazards. If it should 
finally induce us to become a party, it will be time 
enough when France has become such, and after we 
shall have adjusted the condition upon which we are 
to engage. 

But the reality of such an interest is a thing about 
which the best and the ablest men of this country are 



93 

far from being agreed. There are of tin's number, who, 
if the United States were at perfect hberty, would prefer 
an intimate connection between them and Great Brit- 
ain as most conducive to their security and advantage; 
and who are of opinion that it will be well to cultivate 
friendship between that country and this, to the 
utmost extent which is reconcilable with the faith of 
existing engagements : while the most general opin- 
ion is, that it is our true policy, to steer as clear as 
possible of all foreign connection, other than conmier- 

cial * and in this respect to cultivate intercourse 

with all the world on the broadest basis of reciprocal 
privilege. 

An attentive consideration of the vicissitudes which 
have attended the friendships of nations, except in a 
very few instances, from very peculiar circumstances, 
gives little countenance to systems which proceed on 
the supposition of a permanent interest to prefer a par- 
ticular connection. The position of the United States, 
detached as they are from Europe, admonishes them 
to unusual circumspection on that point. The same 
position, as far as it has relation to the possessions of 
European powers in their vicinity, strengthens the 
admonition. 

Let it be supposed that Spain retains her possessions 
on our right, and persists in the policy she has 
hitherto pursued, without the slightest symptom of 

* In Mr. Lodge's edition there is no mark of omission. 



94 

relaxation, of barring the Mississippi against us ; where 
must this end, and at a period not very distant? In- 
falhbly in a war with Spain, or separation of the West- 
ern Country. This country must have an outlet for 
its commodities. This is essential to its prosperity, 
and if not procured to it by the United States, must be 
had at the expense of the connection with them. A 
war with Spain, when our affairs will have acquired 
greater consistency and order, will certainly be to be 
preferred to such an alternative. In an event of this 
sort, we should naturally seek aid from Great Britain. 
This would probaby involve France on the opposite 
side, and effect a revolution in the state of our foreign 
politics. 

In regard to the possessions of Great Britain on our 
left, it is at least problematical, whether the acquisition 
of them will ever be desirable to the United States. 
It is certain that they are in no shape essential to our 
prosperity. Except, therefore, the detention of our 
Western posts, (an object, too, of far less consequence 
than the navigation of the Mississippi,) there appears 
no necessary source of future collision with that power. 

This view of the subject manifests that we may have 
a more urgent interest to differ with Spain, than with 
Britain. And that conclusion will become the stronger, 
if it be admitted, that when we are able to make good 
our pretensions, we ought not to leave in the possess- 
ion of any foreign power the territories at the mouth 
of the Mississippi, which are to be regarded as the 
key to it. 



95 

While considerations of this nature ought not to 
weaken the sense which our Government ought to 
have of any obligations which good faith shall fairly 
impose, the\- ought to inspire caution in jfdopting a 
system, which may approximate us too nearly to 
certain powers, and place us at too great a distance 
from others. Indeed ever)' system of this kind is liable 
to the objection, that it has a tendency to give a wrong 
bias to the Counsels of a Nation, and sometimes to 
make its own interest subservient to that of another. 

If the immediate cause of the impending war be- 
tween Britain and Spain be considered, there cannot 
be drawn from thence any inducements for our favor- 
ing Spain. It is difficult to admit the reasonableness 
or justice of the pretensions on her part, which occa- 
sion the transactions complained of by Great Britain, 
and certainly the monopoly, at which these pretensions 
aim, is entitled to no partiality from any maritime or 
trading people. Hence considerations, neither of jus- 
tice or policy, as they respect the immediate cause of 
the quarrel, incline us towards Spain. 

Putting, therefore, all considerations of peculiar 
good will to Spain or of predilection to any particular 
connection out of the question, the argument respect- 
ing refusal or consent, in the case supposed, seems to 
stand thus : 

The acquisition of the Spanish territories bordering 
upon the United States, by Britain, would be danger- 
ous to us. And if there were a good prospect that 



96 

our refusal would prevent it, without exposing us to a 
greater evil, we ought to refuse. But if there be a 
considerable probability that our refusal would be in- 
effectual, and if being so, it would involve us in war or 
disgrace, and if positive disgrace is worse than war, 
and war, in our present situation, worse than the 
chances of the evils which may befall us from that ac- 
quisition, then the conclusion would be that we ought 
not to refuse. And this appears to be the true con- 
clusion to be drawn from a comprehensive and accu- 
rate view of the subject; though first impressions are 
on the other side. 

These reflections also may be allowed to come in 
aid of it. Good or evil is seldom as great in the reality 
as in the prospect. The mischiefs we apprehend may 
not take place. The enterprise, notwithstanding our 
consent, may fail. The acquisition, if made, may, in 
the progress of things, be wrested from its possessors. 
These, if pressed hereafter, (and we are willing to ac- 
cept it,) may deem it expedient to purchase our neu- 
trality by a cession to us of that part of the territory 
in question, which borders on the Mississippi, accom- 
panied with a guarantee of the navigation of that river. 
If nothing of this sort should happen, still the war will 
necessarily have added millions to the debt of Britain, 
while we shall be recruiting and increasing our re- 
sources and our strength. In such a situation, she 
will have motives of no inconsiderable force for not 
provoking our resentment. And a reasonable confi- 



97 

dcncc ouglit to be reposed in tlie fidelity of the inhab- 
itants of tlie Western country; in their attacliment to 
the Union; in their real interest to remain a part ofit, 
and in their sense of danger from the attempt to sepa- 
rate, which, at every Jiazard, ought to be resisted by 
the United States. 

It is also to be kept in view, that the same danger, 
if not to the same extent, will exist, should the terri- 
tories in question remain in the Jiaiids of Spain. 

Besides all this, if a war should ever be deemed a 
less evil than the neighborhood of the British in the 
quarter meditated, good policy would still seem to re- 
quire, as before intimated, that wc should avoid put- 
ting ourselves in a situation to enter into it, till we 
had stipulated adequate indemnities and considerations 
fordoing so; that we should see a little further into 
the unravelment of the plot, and be able to estimate 
what prospect there would be by our interference of 
obviating the evil. It deserves a reflection, that if those 
territories have been once wrested from Spain, she will 
be more tractable to our wishes, and more disposed to 
make the concessions which our interests require, than 
if they never passed into other hands. 

A question occurs here, whether there be not a 
middle course between refusal and consent; to wit, the 
waiving an answer, by referring the matter to further 
consideration. But to this there appear to be decisive 
objections. An evasive conduct in similar cases is 
never dignified — seldom politic. It would be likely to 



98 

give satisfaction to neither party — to effect no good — 
to prevent no ill. By Great Britain it would probably 
be considered as equivalent to a refusal — as amount- 
ing to connivance by Spain — as an indication of timid- 
ity by all the world. 

It happens that we have a post on the Wabash, down 
which river the expedition, it is presumable, must go. 
If the commannding officer at that post has no orders 
to the contrary, it will be his duty to interrupt the 
passage of the British troops ; if he does, it would seem 
necessary for them, in order to the safe passage of their 
boats, with their artillery, stores, provisions, and bag- 
gage, to take that post. Here then would be a passage 
through our territory, not only without our permission, 
but with the capture of a post of ours, which would be 
in effect making war upon us. And thus silence, with 
less dignity, would produce the same ill consequence 
as refusal. 

If, to avoid this, private orders were to be sent to 
the commanding officer of that post, not to interrupt 
the passage, his not being punished for his delinquency 
would betray the fact and afford proof of connivance. 

The true alternative seems to be, to refuse or con- 
sent: and if the first be preferred, to accompany it with 
an intimation, in terms as free from offence as possible, 
that dispositions will be made to oppose the passage, 
if attempted to be forced ; and accordingly, as far as 
practicable, to make and execute such dispositions. 

If, on the contrary, consent should be given, it may 



99 

deserve consideration wliether it would not be expedi- 
ent to accompany it with a candid intimation that the 
expedition is not agreeable to us, but that thinking it 
expedient to avoid an occasion of controversy, it has 
been concluded not to withhold assent. There are, 
however, objections to this mode. In case of consent, 
an early and frank explanation should be given to Spain. 

Question the Second. — "What notice ought to be 
taken of the measure, if it should be undertaken with- 
out leave, which is the most probable proceeding of 
the two?" 

\{ leaz'e should be asked :xnd refused, and the enter- 
prise should be prosecuted without it, the manner of 
treating it has been anticipated ; that is, the passage, 
if practicable, should be opposed ; and if not practic- 
able, the outrage should be resented by recourse to 
arms. 

But if the enterprise should be undertaken without 
asking leave, which is presumed to be the imjiort of 
the question, then the proper conduct to be observed 
will depend upon the circumstances. 

As the passage contcmj)lated would be by water, and 
almost wholly through an uninhabited part of the 
country, over which we have no actual jurisdiction, if 
it were unaccompanied by any violence to our citizens 
or posts, it would seem sufficient to be content with 
remonstrating against it, but in a tone that would not 
commit us to the necessity of going to war; the ob- 
jections to which apply with full force here. 



lOO 

But if, as it is to be feared will necessarily be the 
case, our post on the Wabash should be forced, to 
make good their passage, there seems to be no alter- 
native but to go to war with them, unwelcome as it 
may be. It seems to be this, or absolute and unquali- 
fied humiliation; which, as has been already noticed, 
is in almost every situation a greater evil than war. 

In every event, it would appear advisable immedi- 
ately to convene the Legislature; to make the most 
vigorous measures for war; to make a formal demand 
of satisfaction ; to commence negotiations for alliances ; 
and if satisfaction should be refused, to endeavor to 
punish the aggressor by the sword.* 

Alexander Hamilton, 
Secretary of the Treasury. 

* The opinion of Hamilton is of special interest, as he had held some 
informal interviews with Major Beckwith upon the attitude of the 
United States towards Great Britain in this Spanish affair. The nego- 
tiation of Gouverneur Morris at London had reached the ears of Lord 
Dorchester, presumably in some official manner, and may have sug- 
gested to him the expediency of sending a similar agent to New York 
to sound the American Executive upon certain questions then pending 
between England and the United States, in which the interests of 
Canada were involved. Beckwith was the agent selected, and on the 
8th of July he held his first communication with Hamilton, and proved 
that he had a full acquaintance with Morris's mission, and expressed 
the belief that the British Cabinet was disposed to enter into an alliance, 
as well as friendly intercourse, with the United States. This led up to 
a suggestion on Beckwith's part, that, if war should occur between Eng- 
land and Spain, it would be for the interest of the United States to take 
part with the former power. The points in dispute between the United 



lOI 

States and England were touched upon, and Indian liostilities disa- 
vowed by Lord Dorchester. The tenor of lieckwitli's communication, 
based as it was upon a letter from Lord Dorchester, was such as to 
convey the impression that it was not made without some knowledge 
and probable suggestion on the part of the English Cabinet. 

ILamilton noted down the main points of this conversation, and sub- 
mitted them to the President and Jefferson. The fust views of the 
latter have already been given in these pages (p. 65, nn/e), but they 
were more distinct and sharply defined in this draft than as afterwards 
expressed. Li the draft lie says the alliance proposed "would involve 
us against France and Spain; and, considered even in amoral view, no 
p)rice could repay such an abandonment of character." In the com- 
pleted paper this is toned down to "as to an alliance, we can say noth- 
ing till its object be shown, and that it is not to be inconsistent with ex- 
isting engagements." But all agreed that in the event of war the 
LTnited States expected to be strictly neutral. 

With this opinion, Hamilton again met IJeckwith on the 22d of July. 
As the liritish agent had no particulars of an alliance to offer as the 
basis of a negotiation, Hamilton said that "the thing is in too general 
a form to admit of a judgment of what may be evemually admissible or 
practicable. If the subject shall hereafter present itself to discussion in 
an authentic and proper shape, I have no doubt we shall be ready to 
converse freely upon it. And you wiH naturally conclude that we shall 
be disposed to pursue whatever shall appear, under all circumstances, 
to 1)6 our interest, as far as may consist with our honor. At present, 1 
would not mean either to raise or depress expectation. 

"Major Beckwith seemed to admit that, as things were circuni- 
stancd, nothing explicit could be expected, and went on to make some 
observations, which I understood as having for object to sound whether 
there existed any connection between Spain and us ; and whether the 
questions with regard to the Mississippi were settled. 

" Perceving this, I thought it best to avoid an appearance of mystery, 
and to declare without hesitation, 

"'That there was no particular connection between Spain and the 
United States within my knowledge, and that it was matter of public 
notoriety, that the questions alluded to were still unatljusted.' " 



I02 

Mr. Douglas Brymner, the courteous archivist of the Dominion of 
Canada, informs me that the letters of Major Beckvvith to Lord Dor- 
chester on his American mission are still in existence, but not in a con- 
dition in which they are available. I am therefore unable to give 
the Major's versions of these conversations. 

When, in October, Hamilton received the decree of the French 
Assembly addressed to Spain (page 26, ante'), he thought that " though 
of a qualified tenor," it looked " pretty directly towards the eventual 
supporting of Spain." — Ilaniilton to Washington, 17 October, 1790. 



OPINION OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR. 

War Office, 29 August, 1 790. 

Sir: In answer to your secret communication of 
the 27th instant, and the questions stated therein, I 
humbly beg leave to observe, 

That the United States, by not being under the ob- 
ligation of any treaty, either with Spain or ICngland, 
are in a situation, to grant, or deny, the passage of 
troops, through their territory, as they shall judge fit. 

The granting or refusing therefore the expected 
demand of a free passage to the troops of England, 
through the territory of the United States, in order to 
attack the dominions of Spain upon the Mississippi, 
will depend upon a due estimation of the consequences 
arising from either alternative. 

The United States are too well aware, of the great 
and permanent evils, which would result from Eng- 
land's becoming possessed of the Mississippi and West 
Elorida, to concur in any arrangements to facilitate 
that event. 

The law of nations establish the principle, that every 
neutral nation may, refuse the passage of troops 
through its territory, when such passage may tend to 
its injury. 

In the present case, the passage of the British troops, 
would be to effect an object directly contrary to the 

(103) 



I04 

interests and welfare of the United States. If there- 
fore the demand should be made, it may be refused, 
consistently with the principles of self preservation, 
and the law of nations. 

But there are two modes of refusal. A denial un- 
accompanied by any other act ; and a denial accom- 
panied by force to oppose the passage, if it should be 
attempted, after having been refused. 

The first mode is all that can with propriety be done 
in the present state of things. If after the denial, the 
british troops should proceed, they become the aggres- 
sors, and establish a just cause of war, whenever the 
interests of the United States shall dictate the measure. 
Although a denial, unaccompanied by any other act, 
might be unpleasant to great Britain, yet she would 
not probably think it, of itself, a sufficient cause for 
waging war against the United States. But if a force 
should be actually opposed to the passage of the 
troops, a wnr with great Britain would appear to be 
the inevitable and immediate consequence. 

The true interests of the United States dictate a 
state of neutrality in the affairs between Spain and 
England. Should the United States be dragged into 
the war in the present moment, the loss of their com- 
merce might justly be expected ; the source of their 
revenue would be cut off, and the proposed system of 
public credit fatally postponed, if not entirely blasted. 
These are serious evils and to be avoided if possible. 

It is however to be remarked that it is highly im- 



I05 

probable that Spain would enter into the war, unless 
she expected to be supported by France. Nor does 
there appear any solid objections to the expectation, 
but the present debilitated and convulsed state of 
France. The family compact and other treaties be- 
tween the two kingdoms will continue to exist, not- 
withstanding the situation of France, until formally 
renounced. This has not been the case. The prob- 
ability therefore is, that France will be combined with 
Spain. 

If this should be the case, every effort on the part of 
France will be employed to associate America in the 
war. And it is a question of great moment whether 
the United States could strictly comply with the 
treaty of friendship and commerce entered into with 
France on the 6th of February, and observe an exact 
neutrality. 

Although it would seem hardly possible that either 
England, or France and Spain combined, would make 
such offers to the United States as to counter-balance 
the advantages of Neutrality, yet the case may be 
otherwise, or the United States may be so obliged to 
enter into the war in order to avert a greater evil. 

These considerations with their extensive relations 
unite in dictating an answer to Lord Dorchester in 
terms as little exceptionable as possible. 

That the United States had recently manifested 
their sincere desires, not only to continue at peace 
with Great Britain, but to cement the same by com- 



io6 

niercial arrangements which might be reciprocally 
beneficial. 

But that the real causes of dispute between England 
and Spain were too little understood at present by the 
United States for the President to consent to a meas- 
ure which would seem to be inconsistent with that 
strict neutrality the United States would desire to 
observe. 

But if notwithstanding this answer, or if no request 
should be made for the purpose, and the troops march 
through the territory of the United States, to attack 
the dominions of Spain, it might be proper for the 
President of the United States to convene imme- 
diately the legislature, if the occasion should be so 
urgent as to require their meeting at an earlier day 
than the adjournment, and to lay the whole affair be- 
fore them, with his opinion of the measures to be pur- 
sued. For the Congress are vested with the right of 
providing for the common defence, and of declaring 
war, and of consequence they should possess the in- 
formation of all facts and circumstances thereunto 
appertaining. 

In the mean time the dispositions and designs of 
the contending parties will unfold themselves. The 
terms of each side be known and estimated, and the 
United States better able than at present to judge of 
the exact line of conduct they ought to pursue. 

I have the honor with perfect Respect to be Sir 
Your humble Servant H. Knox. 

The President of the United States. 



INDEX. 



Adams, John, reply to the President, 45. 
Aranda, Count, 33. 

Barbeyrac, 70, 71. 

Beckwith, Major George, 41, 66, 67 note, 100 note. 

Blount, William, 42. 

Browning, Oscar, 27. 

Brymner, Douglas, 102. 

Cabarras, Count, 38. 
Campo, Marquis del, 29 note, 32, 39. 
Campomanes, Compte de, 40. 
Carmichael, William, 17, 32, 34, 36, 37. 
Cherokee Chiefs in London, 31. 
Clark, looting a Spanish store, 1 1. 
Connolly's mission, 61. 

Diplomacy of the Revolution, 7, 48, 49. 
Dorchester, Lord, 30, 43, 46, 53, 100 note. 

Elliot, Hugh, 27. 

Family compact of France and Spain, 24, 26. 
Fitzherbert, Alleyne, 19, 24, 32. 
Florida Blanca, 9, 24, 28, 32. 
France, aid to United States, 77. 
French Revolution, felt in Spain, 34, 

Galvez, Comptesse, 34. 
Gardoqui, 9, 16, 17. 
Gov/er, Earl, 25, 26, 27, 28. 
Gratitude, 77. 

(107) 



io8 

Great Britain, 7, 22, 41, 47. 
Green, 10, 11. 
Grotius, 70, 71, 72. 

Hamilton, Alexander, 28 note, 68, 69, loo. 
Humphreys, David, 21, 31, 32, 36. 

Jay, John, 9, 10, 44, 50. 

Jefferson, Thomas, 17, 19, 21, 41, 56, 59, 60, 65. 

King, Rufus, 29 note. 
Knox, Henry, 103. 

Lacy, General, 34. 
Lear, Tobias, 29 note. 
Leeds, Duke of, 39, 48. 

Madison, James, 10, 14. 

Mirabeau, 24, 25, 28. 

Miranda, Compte, 29 note. 

Mississippi, navigation of, 10, 15, 16, 22, 32, 36. 

Montmorin, 27, 33. 

Morris, Gouverneur, 17, 29 note, 39, 40. 

Neckar, 27. 

NeutraHty, policy of the United States, 20. 

Nootka Sound, 18, 29. 

Otto, 17. 

Parker, Daniel, 29 note. 
Puffendorf, 70, 71. 

Queen of Spain, 33, 34. 

S6gur, Compte, 34. 

Smith, William I., 29 note. 

Society of 1789, 25. 

Spain, 8, 9, 18, 23, 24, 32, 34, 35, 40, 75, 80. 



I09 

Treaty of 1783, 8, 9, 10. 

Vattel, 51, 70, 73, 76. 
Viar, Josd Ignacio de, 17. 

Washington, George, 10, 20, 30, 43. 
Western Territory, 10, 11, 12. 
West Indies, 25, 81. 



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